Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations
Spring 2021

Essays In International Trade
Eduardo Pinheiro Fraga
Yale University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, edupfraga@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations

Recommended Citation
Pinheiro Fraga, Eduardo, "Essays In International Trade" (2021). Yale Graduate School of Arts and
Sciences Dissertations. 105.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/105

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more
information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

Abstract

Essays In International Trade
Eduardo Pinheiro Fraga
2021
The first chapter studies the factors that determine the degree of spatial concentration of a country’s population. I investigate the drivers of concentration by adding
non-homothetic preferences to a modern quantitative spatial model, obtaining a twosector spatial model in which concentration depends on trade networks, structural
transformation, and location-specific fundamentals (i.e. productivities and amenities). The model delivers an analytical expression decomposing changes in spatial
concentration into separate terms that reflect the roles of these three forces. I then
bring the model to the data in two steps: first, estimate trade gravity equations to
recover year- and sector-specific trade-cost matrices; then calibrate the model to the
2005 global economy (featuring 1611 locations across 192 countries) by finding local fundamentals that rationalize population and income data given the equilibrium
equations. I use this calibrated model for counterfactual exercises that clarify the
role of trade access on spatial concentration. Results indicate that increasing access
to foreign markets reduces concentration in most countries. Finally, I use the modelimplied decomposition equation to disentangle the roles of structural transformation,
differential trade access, and local fundamentals in accounting for the observed 19902015 changes in concentration for 44 countries. The bulk of the variation is explained
by local fundamentals, with only 1% accounted for by differential trade access and
structural transformation.
The second chapter proposes a methodology to estimate the magnitude of nontariff barriers (NTBs) to international trade using real-world data.

I extend a

workhorse quantitative trade model to include NTBs in the form of import licenses
which are randomly granted to each country’s consumers. In equilibrium, a “price
gap” emerges between the average price of imported goods and of domestic goods because import licenses destroy some international transactions, diverting consumers’
purchases towards more expensive domestic varieties. I then propose an approach to
estimate the model and recover model-implied NTB measures by solving the equilibrium equation system for unobservable variables (NTBs, productivities, and trade
costs) given data on observable variables, including price gaps. Intuitively, the model
identifies NTB magnitudes through the size of each country’s average price gap between domestic and imported varieties. Finally, I propose a fixed-effects approach to
estimating price gaps for each country by leveraging separate data sources on import
prices and “overall” prices. This data is used to estimate a fixed-effects model that
yields estimates of country-data source fixed effects. The (exponentiated) cross-data
source difference of these fixed effects provides a measure of country-specific price
gaps, which can then be directly used in the main methodology to invert the model
and obtain NTB measures.
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Chapter 1
Drivers of Concentration: The Roles of
Trade Access, Structural Transformation,
and Local Fundamentals

1.1

Introduction

Which factors determine the degree of spatial concentration of a country’s domestic
population? The concentration of people in space is an important aspect of the
modern global economy, especially because it is associated with higher incomes,
social mobility, and general economic development (see e.g. Glaeser (2011)), which
makes it important to understand its drivers. Moreover, if spatial concentration is
influenced by other economic variables (such as trade costs), then a full account of
the welfare effects of changes in these variables may require explicit recognition of
their effects on concentration. A better understanding of the causes of concentration
may also help us predict the effects on the world’s economic geography of potential
future events such as a retreat from globalization (e.g. due to geopolitical tensions,

1

trade wars, pandemics) or the continued transition of the global economy away from
agriculture.
A traditional literature within urban economics (see e.g. Roback (1982)) states
that the relative attractiveness of different locations for firms and workers depends on
location-specific fundamentals such as local productivity and local amenities, which
therefore affect the distribution of population across locations and, by consequence,
the degree of spatial concentration. Thus, any attempt to understand the drivers
of concentration should include these fundamentals. On the other hand, recent empirical evidence has shown that both access to trade networks and the economy’s
structural transformation away from agriculture can have effects that vary across
space. This observation suggests that these two forces could also influence spatial
concentration. Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, the increase in average spatial concentration across countries (as measured by the primacy rate) between the 1970s
and the 2010s was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the value of international trade (as a fraction of world GDP) and by a substantial reduction in the share
of world population employed in agriculture.1 While these correlations say nothing
about causality, they reinforce our suspicion that these three phenomena could be
related.
In this paper, I investigate the influences of local fundamentals, structural transformation, and differential trade access on spatial concentration through the lens of
a modern quantitative spatial model. Specifically, I extend a state-of-the-art spatial
model (see e.g. Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Allen and Donaldson (2020)) to include
non-homothetic price independent generalized linear (PIGL) preferences (Eckert and
Peters (2018)). I thereby obtain a tractable two-sector spatial model that features
1

As discussed below, the primacy rate is defined as the share of a country’s population that lives
in its largest location.

2

Figure 1.1: Concentration, Trade, Structural Transformation

Notes: the figure portrays three time series: (i) cross-country average of primacy rate i.e. the share of national population in country’s
largest city (data from World Urbanization Prospects 2018); (ii) global agricultural male employment as % of global male employment
(data from World Bank Open Data); (iii) global imports of goods and services as % of global GDP (data from World Bank Open
Data).

differential access to trade networks across domestic locations, structural transformation, and local fundamentals (i.e. exogenous location-specific amenities and sectoral
productivities). Under mild parametric restrictions, the model delivers an analytical
expression for the primacy rate (i.e. the fraction of a country’s population living in
its largest city), which is the measure of spatial concentration I use throughout the
paper. A differential version of this analytical expression allows me to decompose
changes in a country’s degree of spatial concentration into separate terms that reflect
the roles of structural transformation, changes in trade access, and changes in local
fundamentals.

3

I then propose a methodology to bring the model to the data so that it can be
used to analyze spatial concentration in the real world. The methodology has two
steps. In the first step, I recover estimates of the global trade-cost structure for years
1962-2019 by using model-implied trade gravity equations that can be estimated with
data on bilateral distances and on international and intranational trade flows. To
implement these gravity regressions, I first obtain measures of bilateral distance
that take into account the global transportation infrastructure. For this purpose,
I propose an ancillary method to transform transportation network maps into cost
rasters which are then used to compute bilateral distances through a fast marching
method (FMM) algorithm. In the second step, I combine the model’s equilibrium
conditions with data on population, sectoral employment, and per capita income for
1611 locations across 192 countries to calibrate a model of the 2005 global economy.
In this context, calibration means finding vectors of local fundamental amenities and
sectoral productivities that perfectly rationalize the observed spatial distribution of
population, sectoral employment, and income.
Having calibrated the model, I can use it to study the influence of trade access
on spatial concentration by conducting two model-driven counterfactual exercises in
which I impose counterfactual trade-cost structures while keeping other exogenous
variables and parameters fixed at their baseline 2005 levels. For a given counterfactual exercise, I show how to use the model’s equilibrium equations to compute the
spatial distributions of wages, populations, and sectoral employment that the model
predicts would hold under that scenario, as well as the counterfactual primacy rate.
This allows me to evaluate how the trade shocks represented by these counterfactual
trade matrices would affect spatial concentration, as predicted by the full-fledged
general equilibrium model. As for the choice of specific counterfactual trade-cost
matrices, I run two exercises: one eliminating international “border-crossing” costs
4

(CF1), and another increasing international trade costs back to their 1971 levels
(CF2).
To be able to implement this methodology on the 2005 global economy, I obtain a
wealth of data from multiple sources. Data on sector-level bilateral trade flows, which
is used to estimate trade gravity equations in the first step, comes from the World
Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which offers country-level data for
the 1962-2019 period. Global transportation network maps at the 1:10m level for
roads and rail are obtained from the public-domain data set Natural Earth. Data
on 2005 population and sectoral employment at the level of subnational locations
(states, provinces, etc), which is used for calibration in the second step, is obtained
from IPUMS International, an online project that collects and harmonizes census
data from multiple countries. Data on 2005 income per capita at the national level
is obtained from World Bank Open Data, and at the subnational level from G-Econ,
a “geophysically based” data set of the world economy at the level of 1◦ latitude
by 1◦ longitude. These data sources, combined with ancillary data on geographic
coordinates, import shares, and the agricultural share of GDP, gives me everything I
need to estimate gravity equations and calibrate a model of the 2005 world economy
with 1611 locations across 192 countries.
Having devised the methodology and collected the necessary data, I finally bring
the model to the data. The results of the trade gravity regression in the first step
indicate that international trade costs declined substantially between the 1970s and
the 2000s for both agriculture and non-agriculture. While in 1971 the border-crossing
parameter for agriculture (non-agriculture) was equivalent to a 180% (370%) advalorem tariff, that number declined to 130% (280%) in 2005. Calibration results
from the second step are intuitive: developed and oil-rich countries have higher
productivity values.
5

Results of the first counterfactual exercise (CF1), in which I eliminate bordercrossing costs, show that population tends to move to locations that were smaller at
baseline: the correlation between a location’s (log of) initial share of national population and (log of) relative increase in population is -0.23. Thus, spatial concentration
decreases for most countries. The opposite is true for the latter counterfactual CF2,
which increases trade costs. It leads to increased spatial concentration, with the
correlation between (the log of) initial share of national population and (the log of)
percent increase in population being 0.25. Overall, counterfactual results imply that
trade-cost shocks have meaningful effects on spatial concentration. More specifically,
trade-cost increases foster concentration.
The counterfactual exercises also produce interesting results on welfare and trade
volumes. Decreasing international trade costs in counterfactual CF1 leads to substantial increases in trade volumes, with international trade growing from 21% of world
GDP at baseline to 78% in the counterfactual. Welfare gains are also very large, with
the average country’s adjusted welfare sum growing by 57%. The opposite is true for
counterfactual CF2, which raises international trade costs. International trade falls
to 14% of world GDP, while the average country’s adjusted welfare sum falls by 5%.
Overall, this set of results suggests that international trade integration between the
1970s and the 2000s was only partial. Costs were still very high in 2005, with large
increases in welfare and trade flows still left to be materialized by further integration.
Finally, I leverage the model-implied analytical expression governing changes in
the primacy rate to perform an accounting exercise in which I decompose the observed
1990-2005 changes in primacy for a sample of 44 countries into three components
reflecting the roles of structural transformation, differential trade access, and local
fundamentals. Results show that only 1% of the sample variation in primacy changes
can be accounted for by structural transformation and changes in trade access, with
6

the bulk of the variation being accounted for by changes in local fundamentals. Thus,
I conclude that most of the observed 1990-2005 changes in concentration were driven
by changes in fundamental productivities and amenities, with structural change and
differential trade access playing only a secondary role.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 1.3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 1.4 explains my
two-step methodology to bring the model to the data. Section 1.5 presents data
sources and describes data adjustments. Section 1.6 presents results and comments
on them. Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2

Related Literature

The new economic geography (NEG) literature (see e.g. Krugman (1991), Krugman
and Venables (1995)) provides models of monopolistic competition and economies
of scale that generate geographical concentration of economic activity under some
circumstances. Within that literature, the most relevant paper for our purposes
is Krugman and Livas (1996), who explicitly tackle the link between access to international trade and spatial concentration of the domestic population. My paper
revisits this question through the lens of a modern quantitative spatial model that
features agglomerative forces typical of NEG but also two additional forces ignored
by Krugman-Livas (differential trade access and structural transformation) and provides a framework through which I can bring the model to the data, in contrast with
the purely theoretical nature of much of the relevant NEG literature. An empirical
exception to this rule is Ades and Glaeser (1995), who use cross-country regressions
to empirically test the Krugman-Livas hypothesis. However, they do not consider
the importance of differential trade access, and use a cross-country methodology
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which has been criticized (Levine and Renelt (1992), Rodrik (2012)). In contrast,
my paper fully specifies a general equilibrium model through which real-world data
is interpreted.
A recent literature in international trade and economic geography emphasizes the
importance of access to trade networks in determining economic outcomes. Redding
and Sturm (2008) use the post-WWII division of Germany to show that locations
closer to the east-west border, who lost the most market access from division, also
exhibited less population growth. Similarly, Ahlfeldt et al. (2014) use a general
equilibrium model and show that West Berlin neighborhoods closer to the Berlin
wall became relatively less important in terms of land rents and density of economic
activity. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) show that the historical integration of US
counties through railways increased land rents due to improved market access through
the rail network. Brulhart et al. (2019) use worldwide data on night lights to proxy
for economic activity and show that increases in international trade are associated
to disproportionate economic growth in a country’s border regions relative to other
regions. By incorporating domestic and international trade costs, my model naturally
reflects the importance of trade access, which may help shape spatial concentration.
A few papers directly address the effects of international trade on the internal
structures of countries. Fajgelbaum and Redding (2018) study Argentinean 19thcentury economic development with a focus on the impact of international trade
integration on structural transformation and economic development. Their analysis prominently features structural transformation and differential access to foreign
markets, but not the agglomerative NEG-style forces that manifest in my model
through external economies of scale in production. Moreover, structural transformation in their model is driven by comparative advantage forces, while in my model it
is driven by non-homothetic preferences. Finally, their model focuses on Argentina
8

(while mine covers the whole world) during the late 19th and early 20th century
(while mine focuses on the recent past, between the 1960s and the 2000s). Cosar and
Fajgelbaum (2016) develop a two-sector model in which international trade integration affects the spatial population distribution within a country, with a central role
for differential trade access. However, trade-induced changes in sectoral composition
are driven by comparative-advantage mechanisms, not by structural transformation,
which is absent from their model. Furthermore, they assume domestic locations
are homogeneous with regard to comparative advantage, while my model implicitly
relaxes that assumption by allowing flexible sector-specific fundamental productivities to vary freely across locations. Additionally, their assumptions on productive
technology rule out agglomerative forces. Finally, they empirically test the model’s
predictions using reduced-form analysis of Chinese data, while my empirical exercises use worldwide data and are based on using the calibrated model to predict
counterfactual population distributions under alternative trade-cost structures. It
should be mentioned that policymakers have also demonstrated interest in the apparent connection between trade integration and deconcentration of urban systems,
particularly in Latin America (ECLAC (2005)), but have not generally performed
formal analyses to try to assess whether such stylized facts are causal.
I follow a large international trade literature studying how to estimate trade gravity models. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is particularly relevant for studying
the border-crossing cost. I follow Head and Mayer (2014) instructions on how to implement estimation in practice, in particular the exhortation to use Poisson Pseudo
Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) as shown by Santos-Silva and Terneyro (2006).
My framework leans heavily on the quantitative spatial model literature, most of
all on Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Allen and Donaldson (2020). Other influential
examples of that literature are Caliendo et al. (2018), Desmet et al. (2018), Ramondo
9

et al. (2012, 2016), Redding (2016), Adao et al. (2020), and Redding and RossiHansberg (2017), the last of which is a helpful overview of the literature. My main
theoretical distinction with respect to the literature is to incorporate non-homothetic
PIGL preferences into an otherwise standard spatial model, thus allowing structural
change to be explicitly manifested as a force that can affect economic geography. My
main distinction on the empirical front is to calibrate the model for the whole world
economy, which to the best of my knowledge can only be compared to Desmet et al.
(2018), with which my paper has several similarities and differences. In particular, I
am highly indebted to them for their use of G-Econ data to measure local per capita
income and for their methodology to transform transportation network maps into a
cost raster which is then used to compute bilateral distances. On the other hand, the
two papers have very different focuses. My paper features structural transformation
forces, emphasizes the importance of trade access in determining spatial concentration, and focuses on long-term steady-state equilibria, while their paper is scarcely
concerned with concentration, pays much more attention to innovation, growth, and
international migration, and focuses on transitional dynamics. They also use data on
subjective well-being to disentangle countries’ welfare and amenity levels, which is
somewhat moot in the context of my paper because I rule out international migration
by assumption.
Finally, my representation of non-homothetic preferences as a PIGL indirect utility function borrows directly from the literature on structural transformation, chiefly
Boppart (2014) and Eckert and Peters (2018). Most of this macroeconomic literature
deals with aggregate economies rather than with subnational locations. An exception
is Eckert and Peters (2018), who use subnational US data for 1880-2000 to assess
the extent to which country-level structural transformation is associated with worker
reallocation across labor markets. However, there are multiple differences between
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their paper and this one: I use global data rather than focusing on the US; I use
data for relatively recent periods (1960s-2000s) while their data covers older periods
(e.g. the 19th century); spatial concentration is a key outcome of interest for me,
while they are not particularly interested in it; I analyze the geographic impacts of
both structural transformation and changes in international trade costs, while they
are centrally concerned with the former but not with the latter; their production
function includes capital as a factor and features exogenous productivities, while
mine has labor as the sole factor and features external economies of scale which generate agglomeration effects; they assume goods are freely traded, while I put trade
costs at the center stage; they posit a dynamic, overlapping-generations economy
with savings and investment, while my model is static and should be interpreted as
representing a long-run equilibrium. In terms of results, my decomposition exercise
finds that structural transformation plays a minor role in shaping 1990-2005 changes
in spatial concentration, which echoes their finding that structural transformation
in the US did not lead to a major spatial reallocation of workers away from labor
markets that were initially specialized in agriculture.

1.3

Framework

My model is based on an application of the quantitative spatial model of Allen
and Donaldson (2020) to an international context. While they use their model to
study the historical economy of the United States and its component counties, I
take a broader look by applying the spatial model to the whole world, with its
multiple countries which in turn are composed of subnational locations such as states,
provinces, and prefectures. Moreover, their dynamic model is appropriate to study
the evolution of the US spatial economy over decades and centuries, while I will
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instead use a static model and focus on the global economy in a single year (2005).2
My model should thus be interpreted as representing the steady state of an AllenDonaldson model applied to the global economy. In a nutshell, it can be argued
that my paper is broader in space but narrower in time when compared to AllenDonaldson’s.
The world is composed of multiple countries, each composed of multiple locations.
There are two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture, each producing geographically
differentiated goods (i.e. the Armington assumption). Each location has a continuum
of perfectly competitive firms, who produce goods and sell them around the world by
paying an iceberg trade costs. There are external economies of scale in production
(agglomeration economies) but constant returns to scale at the firm level.
The world is populated by agents who are both consumers and workers. Each
utility-maximizing agent is born in a given location, chooses a location to emigrate
to, works for a firm, earns wages, consumes goods, and enjoys local amenities. I
assume migration is only possible within countries, which imbues the model with
a meaningful a notion of “country” (namely, a country is the territory to which
an agent can feasibly migrate given the location where she was born). Households
have non-homothetic preferences of the PIGL form, as in Eckert and Peters (2018).
Holding prices fixed, the share of spending in non-agricultural goods increases with
income. As a result, agriculture becomes a relatively less important sector as a
country becomes richer (i.e. structural transformation).
General equilibrium in the world economy is defined by optimality conditions
(firms maximizing profits, agents maximizing utility) and by market clearing in goods
markets (local sectoral income equals worldwide sales of local sectoral good) and in
2

In decomposition exercises, I also compare the 2005 economy to the economy of another year,
namely 1990. I use comparative-static tools to perform this comparison, which implicitly assumes
that the economy was in steady state in each of these two years.
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labor markets (location population equals both total local immigration and total local
emigration). I show that, in equilibrium, the population share of a country’s largest
location follows an analytical expression that depends on the relative attractiveness
of that location in terms of trade access, fundamental sectoral productivities and
amenities, and non-agricultural expenditure share.
In Sections 1.3.1-1.3.6, I present each aspect of the model in further detail.

1.3.1

Setting

In the model, the world is represented by a finite set S of locations, each of which
denoted by i ∈ S = {1, ..., N }. Individual locations can be interpreted as subnational
units (such as provinces, states, municipalities, etc.). The set S of locations is
partitioned into a set C of countries, indexed by c ∈ C = {1, ..., C}. For convenience,
I also define a function c : S → C which maps each location to the country to which
it belongs.
Each location i in S is inhabited by agents (workers) and firms. Each firm and
agent operates in either of two economic sectors: agriculture (s = A) and nonagriculture (s = N ). Denote with Li the endogenous population of location i and
with L̄c the exogenous population of country c.
Finally, it is convenient to define a primacy function p : C → S, which maps each
country c to the largest city of that country. Following the literature, we also refer
to that largest city as the country’s primate city or just primate. The fraction of
a country’s population that lives in its primate city is denoted primacy rate, which
can be straightforwardly computed by P rimacyc = Lp(c) /L̄c . Note that the primacy
function p(.) is also an endogenous equilibrium object.
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1.3.2

Agents

Each agent is born in a specific location i in country c, then chooses to move to a
location j of her choice within the same country c.3 She then inelastically supplies one
unit of labor to a firm in location j, earns wage income, enjoys locals amenities, and
consumes a variety of geographically differentiated goods (Armington assumption).
The resulting agent’s utility is given by the following formula:

Wj () = Cj uj j ,

(1.1)

| {z }
≡Wj

where uj is the local amenity, j is an agent-specific idiosyncratic taste shock for
location j, and Cj is a PIGL indirect utility function given by:

Cj =

C(wj , PjA , PjN )

1
wj
=
A φ
η (Pj ) (PjN )1−φ

!η

ν PjA
−
γ PjN

!γ

+

ν
1
− ,
γ η

(1.2)

where wj the local wage, and Pjs is the local CES ideal price index for sector s ∈
{A, N } which can be written as:

Pjs = (

X

1

(pskj )1−σs ) 1−σs ,

(1.3)

k∈S

where σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution for sector s, and pskj is the (bilateral)
price of a sector-s good produced in location k and consumed in location j. To
facilitate exposition, I also defined a welfare variable Wj that is the product of the
PIGL consumption variable and the local amenity: Wj = Cj uj .
Inspection of equations (1.1) and (1.2) shows us that the consumption portion of
3

Note that the destination location j may be the birth location i itself.
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the agent’s utility can be described as a composition of CES preferences within sectors
and PIGL preferences across sectors. As we will see, the implied demand system
yields tractable equations while allowing for income effects that shift consumption
from agriculture towards non-agriculture as the agent’s income increases. These
income effects become more apparent in the following equation for the agriculture
consumption share υjA , which is implied by the PIGL preferences:

υjA = φ + ν



PjA γ −η
wj
PjN

(1.4)

Local amenities, represented by uj in the utility function (1.1), can be further
decomposed into an exogenous and an endogenous component according to the equation:

uj = ūj Lβj ,

(1.5)

where ūj is the (exogenous) fundamental local amenity, Lj is local population, and
β ≤ 0 is a parameter that governs the intensity of congestion forces. Following the
urban economics literature, we can interpret the endogenous component Lβj as the
negative effect of spatial congestion on agents’ utility.
Each agent receives an idiosyncratic taste shock j for each location j. These
shocks follow a Frechet distribution: Pr(j ≤ x) = exp(−x−θ ), with θ > 1, and the
shocks are distributed i.i.d. across agents and locations. The presence of this j term
in the utility function helps to “convexify” equilibrium distributions, guaranteeing
that each location j is chosen as a destination by a positive measure of agents and
thus has a non-zero population Lj .
The agent’s migration decision can be concisely summarized by the following
maximization program:
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max Wj ()

j∈c(i)

(1.6)

where Wj () is given by equations (1.1) and (1.2).
Note that the agent is only allowed to migrate to another location within the
same country where she was born. Besides increasing tractability, this assumption
also establishes a meaningful conceptual notion of “country” within the context of
the model. Namely, a country is the set of locations to which a person who is born
in a certain location can feasibly migrate.

1.3.3

Firms

The goods consumed by agents are produced by firms. Each location i and sector
s has a continuum of perfectly competitive firms producing the local sector-s good
according to the following production technology:

qis = Asi lis , with: Asi = Āsi (Lsi )αs

(1.7)

where qis is output quantity, lis is firm employment, Āsi is the local fundamental productivity parameter, Lsi is local employment in sector s, and αs ≥ 0 is a parameter.
Equation (1.7) shows us that the productive technology features constant returns
to scale at the firm level but increasing returns to scale at the local industry level.
This phenomenon is usually described in the literature as external economies of scale
or agglomeration economies. The strength of agglomeration economies is governed
by the parameter αs . The presence of the (Lsi )αs term in equation (1.7) is the central
way in which the agglomerative forces described by the NEG literature appear in
this model.
The goods produced by a firm are sold to consumers worldwide. In order to
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ship a unit of its good to a location j, a firm from location i and sector s pays a
multiplicative “iceberg” shipping cost given by τijs ≥ 1, with τiis = 1.
The assumptions described above regarding perfect competition, production technology, and iceberg shipping costs imply the following pricing equation for the bilateral unit price psij charged by a sector-s firm from location i who sells to location
j:
psij =

1.3.4

τijs wi
Asi

(1.8)

Gravity Flows

Given the assumptions on consumer preferences and firm pricing embedded in equations (1.2), (1.3), and (1.8), it can be shown that bilateral trade flows have the
following “gravity”-like form:


1−σA

τ A wi
XijA =  ijA A 
Ai Pj



XijN

(1.9)

υjA wj Lj

1−σN

τijN wi

= N
Ai PjN

υjN wj Lj

(1.10)

where υjN = 1 − υjA is non-agricultural expenditure share in location j, and Xijs is
the dollar value of trade flows in sector s from location i to location j. The total
bilateral trade flows from location i to location j is given by: Xij = XijA + XijN .
The formulas in equations (1.9) and (1.10) closely follow the usual gravity trade
formulas in the trade literature (e.g. Allen and Arkolakis (2014)). The main difference is the inclusion of multiplicative terms υjA and υjN which account for a location’s
relative expenditure on agricultural and non-agricultural goods, respectively. As a
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location j becomes richer, its consumption basket becomes relatively heavier on nonagricultural goods.
The assumptions on agent utility, amenities, and migration decisions embedded
in equations (1.1), (1.5), and (1.6) imply that bilateral gross migration flows also
follow a “gravity”-like form as given by the following equation:
(Wj )θ
Li
P
θ
k∈S (Wk )
!

Lij =

(1.11)

where Lij is the number of migrants who are born in location i and choose to live in
location j.
Equation (1.11) shows us that a location j will tend to attract many migrants if
it has a relatively high welfare Wj . In my model, equilibrium should be interpreted
as the steady state of a more general dynamic model. In other words, one can think
of this model as the sub-case (of a dynamic model) in which the total population
Li of each location i is constant across periods, which implies that net migration
flows are zero. Gross migration flows Lij need not be zero: it is sufficient that
gross “inbound” flows (

P

k6=j

Lkj ) equal gross “outbound” flows (

P

k6=j

Ljk ) for each

location j. If that equality holds, then inward and outward flows cancel out and
local population remains constant.

1.3.5

Equilibrium

I impose four equilibrium conditions to close the model. The first condition establishes market clearing in goods markets. Namely, for each location i and sector s,
the total income received by firms in that location-sector must equal their total sales
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across all locations in the world:
wi Lsi =

X

Xijs , ∀(i, s)

(1.12)

j∈S

The second condition establishes that a location’s population must correspond to
its total immigration and total emigration:4
Li =

X

Lij =

j∈S

X

Lji , ∀i

(1.13)

j∈S

The third condition simply links a location’s population to the sum of its two
subpopulations, the one that works in agriculture and the one that works in nonagriculture:
N
Li = LA
i + Li , ∀i

(1.14)

Finally, the fourth condition requires that a country’s (exogenous) population
must equal the sum of the populations of all locations that compose that country:
L̄c =

X

Li , ∀c ∈ C

(1.15)

i∈c

Having presented the four equilibrium conditions, we are ready to formally define
equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Given parameters (σA , σN , θ, αA , αN , β, ν, η, γ) and exN
A N
ogenous variables {ĀA
i ,Āi ,ūi }i∈S , {τij ,τij }(i,j)∈S 2 , {L̄c }c∈C , an equilibrium is a set
N
A
N A
A
N
A
N
of endogenous variables {Ci ,wi ,Li ,LA
i ,Li ,Wi ,Pi ,Pi ,υi ,ui ,Ai ,Ai }i∈S , {Xij , Xij ,

Lij }(i,j)∈S 2 that satisfies equations (1.2), (1.3), (1.4),(1.5), (1.7), (1.9) (1.10) (1.11),
equilibrium conditions (1.12)-(1.15), and such that Wj = Cj uj .
4

Note that the total immigration to a location j includes immigration from itself, Ljj . The same
applies to total emigration.

19

It is possible to rewrite the equilibrium system in a simplified manner that conveniently reduces the number of variables and equations. Namely, given parameters
and exogenous variables, an equilibrium is a set of endogenous variables {wi , Li , LA
i ,
N
A
A
N
A
LN
i , Wi , Pi , Pi , υi , ui , Ai , Ai }i∈S that satisfies the following four equations:

wiσs (Lsi )1−αs (σs −1) = (Āsi )σs −1

X

(τijs )1−σs (Pjs )σs −1 υjs Lj wj

(1.16)

j∈S

(Pjs )1−σs =

X

(τijs wi )1−σs (Āsi (Lsi )αs )σs −1

(1.17)

i∈S

Wiθ
L̄
θ c
k∈c Wk

N
LA
i + Li = Li = P

Wj = ūj Lβj

 
1

η

wj (PjA )−φ (PjN )φ−1

η

−

1
ν  A N γ ν
+ −
Pj /Pj
γ
γ η

(1.18)



(1.19)

The main advantage of writing the equilibrium system in this simplified way is
that it suggests an equilibrium-computing algorithm that will be useful later on.

1.3.6

Primacy and Market Access

I consider a special case of the model to better understand its main mechanisms. I
focus on the model’s predictions for the primacy rate, my main measure of spatial
concentration. Assume σA = σN = σ and αA = αN = α. That is, agglomeration
parameters and elasticities of substitution are the same in both sectors. Then it can
be shown that the model yields the following equation for the primacy index of each
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country c in C:


P rimacyc ≡

Lp(c)
=
L̄c
P

−η
ūp(c) ρp(c) ζp(c)Ω

−η
ūk ρk ζk Ω



k∈c



θ
1−θ(β+η/Ω)



(1.20)

θ
1−θ(β+η/Ω)

where ρi = [ η1 (PiA )−ηφ (PiN )η(φ−1) − γ1 (υiA − φ)] is (the inverse of) the ideal total price
1

1

σ−1 A 1−α(σ−1)
σ−1 N 1−α(σ−1)
Πi ]
index, ζi = [(ĀA
Πi ]
+ [(ĀN
is a composite of fundameni )
i )

tal productivities and producer market access, Πsi =
producer market access, and Ω ≡

s 1−σ
(Pjs )σ−1 υjs wj Lj
j∈S (τij )

is

P

σ
.
α(σ−1)−1

The differential form of equation (1.20) is given by:
X Lk
1 − θ(β + Ωη )
A
κk (−dυkA )
d ln(P rimacyc ) = κp(c) (−dυp(c)
)−
θ
L̄
c
k∈c
!





{z

|

}

Structural Change Force

+

Ξp(c) d ln(Ip(c) ) −

X  Lk 
k∈c

|

L̄c

Ξk d ln(Ik )

{z

}

Differential Trade Access Force #1: Consumer Market Access



X  Lk  X
η X s
s
s
s
+
µk d ln(Πk )
µ d ln(Πp(c) ) −
σ s p(c)
s
k∈c L̄c
|

{z

}

Differential Trade Access Force #2: Producer Market Access

+ d ln(ūp(c) ) −

X  Lk 
k∈c

L̄c

d ln(ūk )

{z

|

}

Local Fundamental Force #1: Amenities

X

+χ

µsp(c) d ln(Āsp(c) )

s

|

−

X  Lk  X
k∈c

{z

L̄c



µsk d ln(Āsk )

,

s

Local Fundamental Force #2: Sectoral Productivities

}

(1.21)
where:

χ≡

η(σ − 1)
σ
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1

µsi = (ζi )−1 [(Āsi )σ−1 Πsi ] 1−α(σ−1) ,

1
Iiη
κi =
, Ξi = ,
γρi
ρi
and Ii = (PiA )−φ (PiN )φ−1 is the Cobb-Douglas portion of the ideal price index, which
coincides with the ideal price index when preferences are homothetic (ν = 0, η = 1).
Let us examine equations (1.20)-(1.21) more carefully. Variable Πsi is producer
market access for firms in sector s of location i. This variable will be high if these
firms’ customers have high incomes (wj Lj ), relatively high price levels for sector-s
goods (Pjs ), and are located relatively “close” (low τijs ). Overall, producer market
access Πsj can be interpreted as a measure of how good are the business opportunities
for the producer in terms of having rich markets with a low degree of competitiveness located relatively nearby. Variable ζi is a cross-sector average of a location’s
productivity and producer market access. It will be higher whenever a location is
N
very productive (high ĀA
i or Āi ) or has privileged access to lucrative markets (high
5
N
It is high
ΠA
i or Πi ). Finally, variable ρi is the inverse of the ideal price index.

when sectoral price indices PiA and PiN are low, but also involves a second term
(− γ1 (υiA − φ)) reflecting non-homothetic preferences.
Equation (1.20) has a relatively straightforward interpretation. A country c will
have a high primacy rate if its primate city p(c) has a high fundamental amenity
(high ūp(c) ), a low ideal price index (high ρp(c) ), or a high composite ζp(c) of producer
market access and fundamental productivities. Moreover, what matters is not the
absolute value of these three variables but the relative value they assume for the
primate city compared to other domestic locations, as evidenced by the denominator
5

That is, it can be shown that Cj =

wj
(ρi )−1 .
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−η

θ

Ω 1−θ(β+η/Ω)
in equation (1.20).
k∈c (ūk ρk ζk )

P

Which factors can explain changes in a country’s primacy rate? We can use equation (1.21) to help answer this question by decomposing changes in primacy into the
contributions of structural transformation, changes in trade access, and changes in
local fundamentals. For example, changes in trade costs τ will directly affect producer market access Π and indirectly affect consumer market access I through their
effect on sectoral price indices P A , P N . According to equation (1.21), a country’s
primacy rate will then increase if consumer and producer market access improve
more for the primate location than for other domestic locations. In other words,
since trade access improves differentially across domestic locations, the direction in
which primacy moves will depend on whether the primate location’s trade access is
relatively privileged or harmed by the shock. Hence the idea of a “differential-tradeaccess” force. Analogous observations apply to structural transformation forces and
local-fundamentals forces. Thus, structural transformation, differential trade access,
and local fundamentals each play a particular role in shaping spatial concentration,
as measured by the primacy rate. Finally, note that agglomerative NEG forces are
also represented in the expression (albeit indirectly) through parameter α.

1.4

Bringing the Model to the Data

Having presented the model, I now tackle the question of how to bring the model to
the data. By doing so, I will be able to interpret real-world data through the lens
of the model and thus to estimate the contributions of different factors to spatial
concentration. It will be helpful to keep this goal in mind as this Section 1.4 presents
the specific steps I take to achieve it.
The estimation procedure has two steps. In the first step, I estimate trade costs.
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Using equations (1.9)-(1.10) as a guide, I run gravity regressions using data on global
trade and transportation infrastructure, which then yields estimates of the structure
of bilateral trade costs, and in particular of international trade costs (“border-crossing
parameters”). Since I run these regressions for different years, my trade-cost estimates are also year-specific, covering years from 1962 to 2019. In the second step,
I calibrate the model to the global 2005 economy using location-level data on populations, sectoral employments, and incomes, as well as the trade-cost estimates
obtained in the first step. Specifically, I use the equilibrium system (1.16)-(1.19) to
back out the exact values of fundamental productivities (ĀA , ĀN ) and amenities (ū)
that perfectly rationalize the observed 2005 data, which covers 1611 locations across
192 countries.
Having calibrated the model, I use it for a few empirical exercises. I perform a
series of counterfactual exercises using the equilibrium system (1.16)-(1.19). Specifically, for each exercise, I impose a counterfactual trade cost structure τ cf (while
keeping parameters and exogenous variables such as ĀA , ĀN , ū constant at their
2005 levels) and recompute the equilibrium spatial distributions of population (Lcf )
and wages (wcf ) under this new trade-cost structure. By comparing actual and
counterfactual population distributions, I can assess the effect that the counterfactual trade-cost shock would have on the spatial concentration of population. I also
perform an accounting exercise using decomposition equation (1.21). Specifically, I
repeat the calibration procedure for the global 1990 economy, then use the decomposition equation to disentangle the contributions of structural transformation, changes
in trade access, and changes in local fundamentals in explaining the sample variation
in observed 1990-2005 primacy changes for the 44 countries for which I have data on
subnational locations for both 1990 and 2005.
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1.4.1

First Step: Gravity

In the first step, I estimate bilateral trade costs. To do that, I start by following
Ramondo et al. (2012) and imposing the following functional form for trade costs:
s
τijt
= (Ets )1j6∈c(i)

B
Y

(C s,z )1distij ∈bz

(1.22)

z=1

s
is the bilateral iceberg trade cost in sector s between locations i and j in
where τijt

year t, Ets ≥ 1 is a sector- and year-specific border-crossing parameter, {C s,z }B
z=1 is
a set of sector-specific “cost-of-distance” parameters, distij is the distance between
locations i and j (further detailed below), and {bz }B
z=1 is a set of equally-spaced
distance “bins”. Thus, trade costs have two components: an “international” cost Ets
that is paid whenever a good is shipped across international borders, and a “distance”
cost C s,z that depends on distance in a potentially non-linear manner.
The goal of the first step is to estimate parameters Ets and {C s,z }B
z=1 which will
in turn yield estimates of trade costs through equation (1.22). This is where using
model-implied trade equations (1.9) and (1.10) is helpful. Using equation (1.22) to
substitute for τij into these two equations, we obtain the following estimable trade
gravity equation:

s
ln(Xijt
)=

B
X

(1 − σ s ) ln(C s,z ) 1distij ∈bz +

|
z=1

{z

}

) ln(Ets )

1j6∈c(i) +

C̃ s,z

(1 − σ

s

|

{z

Ẽts

(1.23)
ωits,X

+

s,M
ωjt

+

s
ηijt

}

s,M
where ωits,X = (1 − σs ) ln(wi /Asi ) and ωjt
= ln((Pjs )σs −1 υjs wj Lj ) are exporter-year
s
and importer-year fixed effects respectively, and ηijt
is an added error term.
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s
Given data on trade flows Xijt
, distances distij , and the mapping of locations to

countries (i.e. the function c(.)), one can estimate equation (1.23), thus recovering
estimates of {C̃ s,z }z and Ẽts (respectively denoted {C̃ˆ s,z }z and Ẽˆts ). Following the international trade literature, the estimation method used is Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Head and Mayer (2014)). It
should be noted that identification of the border-crossing term Ẽts requires variation
in the indicator variable 1j6∈c(i) , which means in practice that there must exist data
on both intranational and international trade flows for at least some countries in the
estimation sample. This topic will be further discussed when I present the data in
Section 1.5.
Given estimates {C̃ˆ s,z }z and Ẽˆts obtained from equation (1.23), and assuming
specific values for parameters (σA , σN ), one can then use the definitions of {C̃ s,z }z
and Ẽts to back out estimates of trade-cost parameters {C s,z }z and Ets :

Êts = exp




 ˆ s,z 
C̃
Ẽˆts
, Ĉ s,z = exp
,
1 − σs
1 − σs

(1.24)

Finally, using estimates Êts and Ĉ s,z , I compute estimated trade costs {τ̂ijt }ij
following the parametrization from equation (1.22):

s
τ̂ijt

=

(Êts )1j∈c(i)

B
Y

(Ĉ s,z )1distij ∈bz

(1.25)

z=1

Measuring Distances
One of the variables required for the estimation of gravity equation (1.23) described
in Section 1.4.1 is bilateral distance, distij . In this paper, I do not use straightline distance, as is common in the literature, but rather present a methodology for
accounting for transportation infrastructure when computing bilateral distances.

26

This methodology requires using worldwide infrastructure maps, which I obtain
from the Natural Earth website (see Section 1.5 for details). Figure 1.2 presents the
final map. One notes that the density of transportation infrastructure like roads
and rail varies substantially across regions. For example, transportation density
is generally high in Europe but low in northern Canada and northern Russia. This
suggests that usual straight-line distance measurements, which ignore transportation
infrastructure, could be misleading. Moreover, since much of global transportation
happens over water, it could be important to account for the difference in trade costs
between water and land when measuring bilateral distances.
Figure 1.2: Global Transportation Infrastructure

Notes: the figure portrays the global road and rail networks. Data on location of rail and road was downloaded from the Natural Earth
website: https://www.naturalearthdata.com

Using QGIS software, I transform the global infrastructure map into the cost
raster displayed in Figure 1.3. This is done by first partitioning the Earth’s surface
into grid cells measuring 1◦ of latitude by 1◦ of longitude. For each of six transportation modes m, I assume the mode-specific cost of traversing a single hypothetical
grid cell using that mode is equal to κm , the value of which is based on estimates
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from Allen and Arkolakis (2014).6 I then ascribe a traversal cost T (x) to each grid
cell x that corresponds to the lowest-cost transportation mode present in that grid
cell.7
Formally, let M (x) denote the set of all transportation modes present in grid cell
x. Since every grid cells contains water or land, the set M (x) is guaranteed to be
non-empty for all cells x. The traversal cost T (x) of cell x is then formally given by:

T (x) = min κm
m∈M (x)

(1.26)

One notable feature in Figure 1.3 are the additional pipe-like cells “outside” the
world map. These pipes are simply a programming device that will help with the
computation of least-cost paths between pairs of cells. Specifically, a grid cell x
within a yellow pipe is set to have a very high traversal cost (T (x) = 106 − 1), while
a blue-pipe cell x has a very low traversal costs (T (x) = 0.00001). This allows a
traveler to move at near-zero cost from the eastern edge to the western edge of the
world map (or vice-versa) as long as she stays at the same latitude. Similar low-cost
pipes are placed in the North and South Poles. This allows me to implement a leastcost path algorithm in a straightforward manner by using the two-dimensional fast
marching method of Allen and Arkolakis (2014). The algorithm will work despite
the fact that, unlike Allen and Arkolakis (2014), I must account for the sphericity of
the Earth.
Given the cost raster of Figure 1.3, we are finally ready to compute bilateral
distances. The distance between each pair of grid cells is simply the total traversal
cost of the least-cost path that connects the two grid cells. Formally, for a given
6

The values of mode-specific per-cell costs κm are: κwater = 0.0779, κrail = 0.1793,
κinterstate highway = 0.5640, κnon−interstate highway = 0.717, κarterial road = 1.1270, κland = 1.9200.
See Appendix 1.8.3 for a more detailed explanation of how these specific values were chosen.
7
For example, suppose a grid cell x contains both land and rail. Since rail offers cheaper
transportation than land, the grid cell’s traversal cost T (x) is set to κrail .
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Figure 1.3: Cost Raster

Notes: the figure portrays a cost raster in which the value of each pixel is color-coded. The scale on the right-hand side indicates the
mapping from colors to values.

origin grid cell i and destination grid cell j, define Pij as the set of all continuous
paths p on the world map that start at location i and end at location j.8 Then,
the distance between locations i and j is the results of the following minimization
program:
distij = min

X

p∈Pij x∈p

T (x)

I implement the minimization program for all relevant grid cells using the fast
marching method (FMM) algorithm from Allen and Arkolakis (2014).9 As an illusA path p is classified as continuous if all pairs of adjacent cells within the path are either
physically adjacent or connected by a blue pipe.
9
For computational reasons, I do not implement the minimization program for all grid-cell pairs
8
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tration, the heat map in Figure 1.4 portrays the bilateral distances between a single
destination cell (market with a star) and all other cells in the world. Some of most
accessible cells with respect to the star are located in the northwestern corner of the
figure, showing that the blue-pipe device worked to cheaply connect the western and
eastern ends of the map. Moreover, note that infrastructure matters: for example,
the innermost regions of Africa are much more expensive to reach than Central Europe because rail and road networks are much denser in the latter. Finally, ocean
transportation also matters: cell pairs that are connected by water pathways rather
than land pathways tend to have lower bilateral distances.

1.4.2

Second Step: Calibration

Having estimated trade-cost structures in the first step, I proceed to calibrate the
model to the 2005 global economy. In this context, calibration means finding the vecN
tors of fundamental productivities ({ĀA
i,2005 , Āi,2005 }i∈S ) and amenities ({ūi,2005 }i∈S )

that rationalize the observed 2005 spatial distribution of wages ({wi,2005 }i∈S ) and
N
sector-level populations ({LA
i,2005 , Li,2005 }i∈S ) given the estimated 2005 trade-cost
s
structure ({τ̂ij,2005
}ij ). What is meant by “rationalization” is that these vectors of

fundamental productivities and amenities must be such that the equilibrium equations (1.16)-(1.19) hold exactly, given observed population, sectoral employment and
wage distributions.
Formally, one recovers fundamental productivities and amenities by first solving
N
s
s
the following equilibrium system for variables (ĀA
2005 , Ā2005 , P2005 , υ2005 ):

as this will not be necessary for the rest of the analysis. Instead, I implement the minimization
program for all destination cells that house a centroid of at least one relevant polygon. Relevant
polygons are polygons that represent a location/country that appears either in the estimation
sample of the gravity equation (see Section 1.4.1) or in the calibration (see Section 1.4.2).
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Figure 1.4: Heat Map: Transportation Cost

Notes: the figure portrays a heat map in which the transportation cost between the pixel marked with the star and every other pixel
on the map is color-coded. The scale on the right-hand side indicates the mapping from colors to values.

σs
wi,2005
(Lsi,2005 )1−αs (σs −1) = (Āsi,2005 )σs −1

X

s
s
s
(τ̂ij,2005
)1−σs (Pj,2005
)σs −1 υj,2005
Lj,2005 wj,2005

j∈S

s
(Pj,2005
)1−σs =

X

s
(τ̂ij,2005
wi,2005 )1−σs (Āsi,2005 (Lsi,2005 )αs )σs −1

i∈S

−η
N
A
A
= φ + ν(Pj,2005
/Pj,2005
)γ wj,2005
υj,2005

Intuitively, by solving this equation system I find the set of fundamental productivities that results in a set of prices such that the supply and demand for the
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good produced by each location-sector are perfectly balanced (while taking as given
the distribution of wages, populations, and sectoral employments). The next step is
to find the set of fundamental amenities that rationalizes the spatial distribution of
population by solving the following equation system for variables (ū2005 , W2005 ):

Wj,2005 = ūj,2005 Lβj,2005

 
1

η

η

A
N
wj,2005 (Pj,2005
)−φ (Pj,2005
)φ−1 −

Li,2005

πc ≡

γ ν 1
ν A
N
+ −
Pj,2005 /Pj,2005
γ
γ η



Wi,2005 θ
=P
θ L̄c(i),2005
k∈c Wk,2005

X

Wk,2005 θ

1
θ

= 1, ∀c ∈ C

k∈c

Intuitively, by solving this equation system I first find the set of welfare values
that makes agents desire a spatial distribution of population that corresponds to the
distribution actually observed in the data, and then I back out the set of fundamental amenities needed to implement these welfare values (all while taking wages,
populations, and prices as given).
Note that in addition to equilibrium conditions (1.18)-(1.19), I also use the normalization condition πc = 1, which states that the adjusted welfare sum πc in each
country must equal one. Why is this condition necessary? The reason is that, within
a given country, the average amenity level and the average welfare level are not separately identified. For example, if a certain set of fundamental amenities and welfares
rationalizes a specific data set, then that data set can be equally rationalized if we
multiply all fundamental amenities in a given country by two while also multiplying
all welfares in that country by two. Therefore, normalizing average welfare levels
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within a country is necessary to obtain an unique vector of fundamental amenities.
The only relevant consequence of this normalization is that I will not be able to
compare welfare levels across countries, which is not particularly problematic in the
context of my model because I had already ruled out international migration by
assumption. I will still be able to compare welfare levels across locations within a
country and to compare welfare levels across different counterfactual scenarios for a
given location or country.
Equations in this Section 1.4.2 contain multiple parameters (σA , σN , αA , αN , θ, β,
η, ν, γ, φ) whose knowledge is necessary for calibration. Table 1.1 displays the specific
values these parameters assume in my implementation. Elasticities of substitution σs
use a typical value from the trade literature (e.g. Simonovska and Waugh (2011)).
Agglomeration parameters αs are based in Rosenthal and Strange (2004). Tastedispersion parameter θ and PIGL parameter ν are chosen to guarantee equilibrium
existence. Congestion parameter β is taken from Allen and Donaldson (2020). PIGL
parameters η and γ are taken from Eckert and Peters (2018). Asymptotic agricultural
share of consumption φ is set to the agricultural share of Germany’s GDP in 2019.10

1.4.3

Counterfactuals

s
}ijt ) in the first step and computed fundamentals
Having estimated trade costs ({τ̂ijt

in the second step, I can use the calibrated model to perform empirical exercises,
such as counterfactuals. Each counterfactual exercise can be thought of as the answer to the following question: how would the observed 2005 distribution of wages
and populations change if the world’s trade-cost structure changed while the other
fundamentals remained the same? These exercises can thus help us understand the
10

Germany is chosen because it is a particularly developed economy and thus far along in its
path of structural change. Other developed countries yield similar values. The German number is
taken from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/295519/
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values

Parameter
Description
Value
σA , σN
Sector-level elasticity of substitution
4
θ
Dispersion parameter of taste shock
1.2
αA , αN
Sector-level agglomeration elasticity
0.1
β
Congestion elasticity
-0.345
ν
Degree of non-homotheticity
0.1
η
Concavity of Cobb-Douglas portion of utility
0.31
γ
Concavity of non-homothetic portion of utility 0.35
φ
Asymptotic agricultural share of consumption
0.01
Notes: for each parameter in the model, this table displays a description of the parameter and the value I impose for that parameter.

influence of trade access on the world’s economic geography, in particular on spatial
concentration.
Therefore, each counterfactual exercise is characterized by its specific counterfactual trade-cost matrix, τ cf . Given this matrix τ cf and the fundamental productivities
N
and amenities (ĀA
2005 ,Ā2005 ,ū2005 ) recovered in the second step, I can then compute

the counterfactual equilibrium by solving the equilibrium system of equations (1.16)(1.19) for counterfactual variables: wages, populations, sectoral employments, price
levels, agricultural share of consumption, and welfare (wcf , Lcf , Lcf,A , Lcf,N , P cf,A ,
P cf,N , υ cf,A , W cf ):

(wicf )σs (Lcf,s
)1−αs (σs −1) = (Āsi,2005 )σs −1
i

X

cf
(τijcf,s )1−σs (Pjcf,s )σs −1 υjcf,s Lcf
j wj

j∈S

(Pjcf,s )1−σs =

(τijcf,s wicf )1−σs (Āsi,2005 (Lcf,s
)αs )σs −1
i

X
i∈S

Lcf,A
+ Lcf,N
= Lcf
i
i
i = P
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(Wicf )θ
cf θ L̄c(i),2005
k∈c (Wk )

Wjcf

=

β
ūj,2005 (Lcf
j )

 
1

η

η
wjcf (Pjcf,A )−φ (Pjcf,N )φ−1

γ
1
ν
ν
− Pjcf,A /Pjcf,N + −
γ
γ η



After solving this equation system, I can easily recover other variables of interest
such as countries’ primacy indices and adjusted welfare sums:

=

P rimacyccf

πccf =

X

Lcf
pcf (c)

(1.27)

L̄c,2005

(Wkcf )θ

1

(1.28)

θ

k∈c

where pcf (.) is the primacy function that holds in the counterfactual equilibrium.
Note that computing adjusted welfare sums πccf is useful because this variable
offers a concept of country-level welfare. Moreover, since this variable was normalized
in the second step to equal one, its counterfactual value can be straightforwardly
interpreted as the country’s relative welfare gain due to the counterfactual trade
shock. For example, if πccf = 1.8 for a given country c, we can then conclude that
this country’s average welfare sum increased 80% due to the counterfactual change
in trade costs.
Finally, given counterfactual variables (τ cf,A , τ cf,N , wcf , Lcf,A , Lcf,N , Lcf , υ cf,A ),
it is straightforward to compute counterfactual trade flows according to equations
(1.9)-(1.10):


Xijcf,s = 

τijcf,s wicf
Āsi,2005 (Lcf,s
)αs Pjcf,s
i

1−σA


υjcf,s wjcf Lcf
j

which then allows me to compute each country’s counterfactual import share, as well
as the causal effect of the counterfactual trade shock on the share of global trade in
35

world GDP:


M
∆
Y


W LD

P

=P

M
Y

s∈{A,N }

s∈{A,N }

cf
c

P

=P

s∈{A,N }

s∈{A,N }

P

P

i6∈c

Xijcf,s

P

P

i∈S

Xijcf,s

j∈c

j∈c

P

P

i6∈c

Xijcf,s

P

P

i∈S

Xijcf,s

j∈c

j∈c

(1.29)

s
Xij,2005
−P
P
P
s
s∈{A,N }
j∈c
i∈S Xij,2005

P

s∈{A,N }

P

j∈c

P

i6∈c

(1.30)

Therefore, equations (1.27)-(1.30) allow us to assess the extent to which counterfactual trade shocks affected spatial concentration, welfare, and the volume of
international trade. Additionally, it is also possible to assess how much spatial reallocation matters as a channel for the effects on welfare and volume by comparing
the counterfactual values of these two variables against their values in an alternative
“immobility” counterfactual in which the trade-cost matrix is still τ cf but agents are
not allowed to spatially reallocate away from their baseline location (see Appendix
1.8.5 for details).

1.4.4

Decomposition

I also use the calibrated model to perform a decomposition exercise. Specifically, I
use equation (1.21) to decompose the changes in spatial concentration (as measured
by the primacy rate) between 1990 and 2005 into the contributions of structural
transformation, changes in trade access, and changes in local fundamentals (i.e. exogenous productivities and amenities). To implement the exercise, start by rewriting
equation (1.21) in a more succinct form:

P rimacyc,2005
d ln(P rimacyc ) = ln
P rimacyc,1990




DT A
= contST
+ contLF
c + contc
c ,
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(1.31)

where:

contST
c =

A
contDT
=
c





θ
1 − θ(β +

θ
1 − θ(β +

h
η
Ω)


η
Ω)

A
κp(c),2005 (−dυp(c)
)−

X  Lk,2005 
k∈c

Ξp(c),2005 d ln(Ip(c) ) −

L̄c,2005

X  Lk,2005 

L̄c,2005

k∈c

i

κk,2005 (−dυkA ) ,

Ξk,2005 d ln(Ik )

i
X  Lk,2005  X
ηhX s
+
µsk,2005 d ln(Πsk ) ,
µp(c),2005 d ln(Πsp(c) ) −
σ s
L̄c,2005 s
k∈c


contLF
=
c



θ
1 − θ(β +


η
Ω)

d ln(ūp(c) ) −

X  Lk,2005 
k∈c

L̄c,2005

d ln(ūk )

i
X  Lk,2005  X
η(σ − 1) h X s
µp(c),2005 d ln(Āsp(c) ) −
+
µsk,2005 d ln(Āsk ) ,
σ
L̄c,2005 s
s
k∈c


and the differential operator d refers to changes between 2005 and 1990, i.e. dxi =
xi,2005 − xi,1990 for any variable x.
Empirical implementation of equation (1.31) requires data on population (L2005 )
A
, κ2005 , Ξ2005 , I2005 , µ2005 , Π2005 , ū2005 ,
and knowledge of calibrated variables (υ2005
N
ĀA
2005 , Ā2005 ) for baseline year 2005, all of which were recovered in the second step.
N
However, to compute the differentials (dυ A , d ln(Ik ), d ln(ΠA
k ), d ln(Πk ), d ln(ūk ),
A
N
d ln(ĀA , d ln(ĀA )), I also need knowledge of variables (υ1990
, I1990 , ΠA
1990 , Π1990 , ū1990 ,
N
ĀA
1990 , Ā1990 ) for year 1990. Thus, it is necessary to separately calibrate the model

to the global 1990 economy using the same methodology from Section 1.4.2 that was
used for baseline year 2005.11
Taking the variance operator of equation (1.31), I obtain the following decompo11

See Appendix 1.8.6 for more details on the calibration of the 1990 economy.
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sition for the variance of primacy changes:

Var(d ln(P rimacy)) = Var(contST ) + Var(contDT A ) + Var(contLF )
+ 2cov(contST , contDT A ) + 2cov(contST , contLF ) + 2cov(contDT A , contLF ) (1.32)
DT A
,contLF
Thus, after using calibration results and data to recover (contST
c )
c ,contc

for 44 countries in my sample with the help of equation (1.31), I can then decompose
the variance of 1990-2005 changes in primacy into components explained by structural transformation, change in trade access, and changes in local fundamentals (as
well as the covariances among the three) using equation (1.32).12 This allows me to
measure the extent to which each of these three drivers have mattered in accounting
for the changes in spatial concentration that happened in the recent past in these
countries.

1.5

Data

In this section, I describe the data sources from which I obtained the variables used
to bring the model to the data. I also describe data adjustments that were necessary
to bring the data into an appropriate format for usage in my empirical applications.
12

These 44 countries are the ones for which I have IPUMS data on subnational units for both
1990 and 2005.
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1.5.1

Population

IPUMS International
My main source of location-level population is IPUMS International, a project that
harmonizes and disseminates census data from multiple countries around the world.
I use the version of the data at the first level of geographic disaggregation, which
typically partitions countries into states or provinces. For each country, whenever
2005 data is not available, I use data from the closest year to 2005 as long as that
year is within the 1995-2011 interval. My final IPUMS samples covers 79 countries,
totaling 1511 locations. Figure 1.5 displays the world map with countries partitioned
into IPUMS locations (with geometric centroids overlayed).
Figure 1.5: Countries, Subnational Locations, and Geometric Centroids

Notes: the figure portrays a world map partitioned into countries and within-country subnational units corresponding to the geographic
coding of the IPUMS International data set for year 2005. Subnational units are typical states or provinces. In addition, for each
country or subnational unit, the map displays the geometric centroid (in orange) of the polygon that represents that location.

IPUMS data includes local employment by industry, which is coded according
to variable INDGEN (“Industry, general recode”). I aggregate this variable’s multiple categories into two groups: agriculture (category 010, “Agriculture, fishing, and
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forestry”) and non-agriculture (categories 020-130). The resulting variables (agricultural and non-agricultural employment) are the data analogues of model variables
N
LA
2005 and L2005 .

World Bank Open Data
IPUMS data by subnational location does not cover every country: for example,
note that Australia is not divided into provinces in Figure 1.5. Therefore, sectoral
population data at the national level is needed. For these countries, I obtain national
2005 population data (L2005 ) from World Bank Open Data, which covers the 19602019 period. I then distribute this national population between the agricultural and
N
non-agricultural sectors (LA
2005 ,L2005 ) using another variable from World Bank Open

Data, the agricultural share of GDP (formally “Agriculture, forestry, and fishing,
value added (% of GDP)”). Conveniently, this variable uses the same sectoral coding
as the one from variable INDGEN in IPUMS, thus guaranteeing comparability. The
agricultural share of GDP is missing for some countries for 2005, so in these cases I
impute it using the closest year (as long as that year is within the 1995-2015 time
window).
Even for countries for which IPUMS data at the subnational level is available,
World Bank Open Data’s national population data is helpful. To guarantee comparability, I adjust these countries’ sector-location population distributions so that
the implied national population matches its World Bank Open Data 2005 national
population. Specifically, the population in sector s of location i is set to:

Lsi,2005

=

BOD
L̄W
c(i),2005
s,IP U M S
Li,2005 P
IP U M S
j∈c(i) Lj,2005

UMS
where Ls,IP
is the population of sector s of location i in 2005 according to IPUMS,
i,2005
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UMS
BOD
LIP
is the population of location i in 2005 according to IPUMS, and L̄W
i,2005
c,2005 is

the 2005 national population of country c according to World Bank Open Data.

1.5.2

Per capita income

To obtain data on 2005 local wages (w2005 ), I follow Desmet et al. (2018) and use the
data set G-Econ 4.0. This is a project that builds a “geophysically based data set
on economic activity for the world”. The basic units of measurement are grid cells
measuring 1-degree longitude by 1-degree latitude, for each of which output (gross
cell product) and population are estimated.
I divide output by population to obtain an estimate of each cell’s per capita
income for year 2005, which proxies for wages in my empirical applications. The
basic data set cointains 24,903 cells (some of which involve more than one country)
but only 17,043 of them have enough information to compute income per capita.
Given this wage proxy for grid cells, I use this data to compute wages at the
level of IPUMS subnational locations. Note that each location i is represented by a
polygon poli , as seen in Figure 1.5. I set the wage of that location i to be a weighted
average of the wages of the grid cells that overlap its polygon poli , where the weights
are given by the land area of the intersection of each grid cell with the polygon.
Formally, let all grid cells in the world be indexed by g = 1, ..., G and let the wage
of grid cell g be denoted by wagecellg,2005 . Then, the wage wi,2005 of each location i
represented a polygon poli is set to:

wi,2005 =

G
X



wagecellg,2005

g=1

Area(g ∩ poli )
Area(poli )



For countries for which IPUMS data at the subnational level is not available, I
simply obtain 2005 per capita income (officially “GDP per capita (current US$)”)
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from World Bank Open Data, which covers the 1960-2017 period.

1.5.3

Trade flows

World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) is a data service by the World Bank
“in collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and in consultation with organizations such as International Trade Center, United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO)”. From this source I obtain country-level bilateral trade flows in US dollars
for 1962-2019. The data lists trade flows separately by sector, including agriculture.
I compute non-agricultural trade flows by subtracting bilateral agricultural trade
flows from total bilateral trade flows. Whenever that results in a negative value for,
I replace that value with zero.
As mentioned in Section 1.4.1, identification of the border-crossing parameter
when estimating the trade gravity equation requires data on both intranational and
international trade flows. WITS only covers international trade.13 So, I augment the
data set by imputing sector-level trade flows from a country i to itself (i.e. Xiis ) using
two additional country-level variables from World Bank Open Data: agricultural
share of GDP Agsh, which was already mentioned in Section 1.5.1, and import share
M sh (officially “Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)”).
The imputing procedure for Xiis goes as follows. First use WITS data to compute
each country-sector international exports each year: EXPits =

P

country’s international imports each year: IM Pit =

N
+ Xjit
). To obtain

A
j6=i (Xjit

P

j6=i

s
Xijt
; and each

implied national GDP Yit , divide international exports IM Pit by import share M shit :
13

As a robustness check, in Appendix 1.8.4 I rerun gravity regressions for year 2010 using WITS
data and compare its results to the analogous gravity regression that uses the German data set
Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030, which has (non-imputed) intranational trade data for Europe
in 2010. Check Appendix 1.8.4 for details and results.

42

Yit =

IM Pit
M shit

This national GDP can be distributed between agricultural and non-agricultural
GDP using data on the agricultural share of GDP. Specifically, national agricultural
and non-agricultural GDP (YiA , YiN ) are given by:

YitA = Yit × Agshit , YitN = Yit × (1 − Agshit )
s
in sector s of country i as the difference
Finally, I compute intranational trade Xiit

between sectoral GDP and sectoral exports:

s
Xiit
= Yits − EXPits
s
Any resulting negative intranational trade flows (Xiit
< 0) are dropped from the

sample.

1.5.4

Transportation infrastructure

I download maps of global transportation infrastructure from Natural Earth, a public
domain data set (Desmet et al. (2018)). I use the “large-scale” version of the data
set containing cultural aspects of the terrain.14 From the list of cultural aspects, I
select the layers “roads” and “railroads”.
In Natural Earth, roads are categorized, so it is necessary to create a mapping
from those categories to the ones for which we have estimates of traversal costs (see
Section 1.4.1). I classify “beltway” and “major highway” as interstate highways,
“secondary highway” as non-interstate highway, and the remaining road types as
14

Download links can be found at: https://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-culturalvectors/
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arterial roads. I delete all road features that correspond to over-water transportation
(ferries).
Using these transportation network maps, I generate the cost raster of Figure 1.3
following the procedure described in Section 1.4.1.

1.5.5

Geographic coordinates

I use the maps provided by IPUMS International to obtain geographic coordinates for
countries and subnational locations. For subnational locations, I use the GIS boundary file titled “spatially harmonized first-level geography” (world geolev1 2019.shp),
which is displayed in Figure 1.5. For countries, it’s the GIS boundary file titled
“world map” (world countries 2017.shp). In either case, I use QGIS to compute the
geometric centroids of the polygons representing each country or location. This process yields a total of 248 country centroids and 2023 subnational location centroids
(see Figure 1.5).

1.5.6

Bilateral Distances

For each pair of subnational locations and/or countries, bilateral distances distij are
computed using the centroids obtained in Section 1.5.5. First, I locate the two 1◦ x
1◦ grid cells in which the two centroids are located. Then, as described in Section
1.4.1, I apply the fast marching method (FMM) algorithm using the cost raster
mentioned in Section 1.5.4 (see Figure 1.3) to compute the bilateral distance between
the two cells.
Note that after obtaining bilateral distances I must partition the distance range
into bins to implement the trade gravity regression (as explained in Section 1.4.1).
To do that, I first take the maximum bilateral distance in the data set (which is the
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distance between Greenland and Russia, approximately 33.35) and multiply it by
1.05 to obtain an upper bound dmax . I then divide the interval [0, dmax ] into B = 30
equally spaced distance bins.

1.5.7

Final calibration sample

After performing all data adjustments described in this Section 1.5 and dropping
countries for which it was not possible to obtain estimates of sector-level population
and/or per capita income (neither at the national nor subnational level), I arrive at
the final sample that will be used in the calibration exercise. This includes N = 1611
locations across C = 192 countries.

1.6

Results

In this Section, I present the results of the empirical exercise by which I bring the
model to the data. I first present results of trade gravity estimation (first step). Then
I discuss the calibration results (second step) and the results of the counterfactual
exercises. I use counterfactual results to further discuss the effects of trade shocks on
welfare and trade volumes, as well as the extent to which these effects are influenced
by population mobility across space and sectors. Finally, I present the result of
the decomposition of 1990-2005 primacy changes into the contributions of structural
transformation, changes in trade access, and changes in local fundamentals.

1.6.1

Results of First Step: Gravity

I now present results for the main trade gravity regressions, as described in Section 1.4.1, using WITS trade data. Estimated sector-level costs of distance bins
{C s,z }B
z=1 for year 2005 are displayed on Figure 1.6. The costs of traversing a given
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distance seems to be slightly higher for agriculture than non-agriculture, but overall
the estimates are roughly similar.
Figure 1.6: Cost of Distance Bins (2005)

Notes: the figure portrays the estimated values of the agricultural and non-agricultural distance costs Ĉ A,z and Ĉ N,z for each one of
the distance bins z ∈ {0, ..., B}.

Figures 1.7 and 1.8 present estimates of sector-level border-crossing parameters
Êts , by year. Overall, border-crossing costs are substantially lower for agriculture
than for non-agriculture. For both sectors, there seems to have been a substantial
decrease in trade costs between the 1960s and today. For example, the agricultural
border-crossing cost in the early 1960s was equivalent to a 200% ad-valorem tariff,
decreasing to approximately 130-150% in the late 2010s. Similarly, for the nonagricultural sector border-crossing costs seem to have declined from around 400% to
270% between the 1960s and the 2010s. These estimates are consistent with findings
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in the trade literature that point to a trend of declining international trade costs
over the second half of the twentieth century.
Figure 1.7: Estimated Border-Crossing Cost, Agriculture

Notes: the figure portrays the estimated agricultural border-crossing cost ÊtA for each year t between 1962 and 2019.

As described in Section 1.4.1, I use the estimated distance costs and bordercrossing costs presented in this section to construct estimated trade-cost matrices
for years 1971, 1990 and 2005 (τ̂1971 ,τ̂1990 ,τ̂2005 ). These trade-cost matrices that will
be used in the calibration, counterfactual exercises, and decompositions below.

1.6.2

Results of Second Step: Calibration

I now present the results of the second step, namely calibration. As described in
N
Section 1.4.2, I back out the fundamental productivity (ĀA
2005 ,Ā2005 ) and fundamental
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Figure 1.8: Estimated Border-Crossing Cost, Non-Agriculture

Notes: the figure portrays the estimated non-agricultural border-crossing cost ÊtN for each year t between 1962 and 2019.

amenity (ū2005 ) vectors that rationalize the observed 2005 worldwide distribution of
wages, population, and sectoral employment across 1611 locations in 192 countries.
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 display estimated fundamental productivities in 2005.
As one can see in the figure, the spatial distribution of fundamental productivities
is somewhat intuitive. Developed countries and oil-rich countries tend to display
particularly large values. Within countries like China, richer regions (e.g. eastern
China) tend to have somewhat higher fundamental productivities than poorer regions
(e.g. western China).
Figure 1.11 displays the estimates of fundamental amenities. It should be emphasized that cross-location comparisons of amenities are meaningful within countries
but not across countries. As explained in section 1.4.2, within-country average fun48

Figure 1.9: Fundamental Productivities, Agriculture (2005)

Notes: the figure portrays the calibrated fundamental agricultural productivity ĀA
i,2005 in year 2005 for each location i in the world.

damental amenities are not separately identified from within-country average welfare,
making it necessary to normalize each country’s adjusted welfare sum to an arbitrary
number (πc,2005 = 1). However, it is still possible to compare fundamental amenities
within a country. As a general rule, the calibration tends to yield relatively high estimates of fundamental amenities for well-populated regions within a country. From
the perspective of the model, this is necessary to rationalize a large number of people
in those locations whenever their superior income or market access is not sufficient
to fully counterbalance their substantial congestion given the assumption of costless
internal migration.

1.6.3

Results of Counterfactual Exercises

Counterfactual trade matrices
As described in Section 1.4.3, each counterfactual exercise is characterized by its
counterfactual trade-cost structure. Thus, before presenting results for counterfactual exercises, it is necessary to present the specific counterfactual trade-cost matrices
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Figure 1.10: Fundamental Productivities, Non-Agriculture (2005)

Notes: the figure portrays the calibrated fundamental non-agricultural productivity ĀN
i,2005 in year 2005 for each location i in the
world.

that will be used in these exercises. I run two counterfactual exercises. The first exercise, CF1, lowers international trade costs by simply eliminating border-crossing
costs from the estimated trade-cost structure. One can think of this scenario as the
elimination of all international trade barriers, be them policy-driven (e.g. tariffs,
non-tariff barriers) or not (e.g. language differences, social networks). Formally,
trade costs in counterfactual CF1 are given by:

τijs,cf 1 =

B
Y

s,z 1distij ∈bz
)
(Ĉ2005

z=1

The second counterfactual exercise, CF2, increases trade costs back to their 1971
levels. This counterfactual should be interpreted as answering the question: how
would the global 2005 distribution of population and wages change if trade costs
rose to their 1971 levels while the remaining economic fundamentals remained the
same? Formally, the counterfactual trade-cost matrix is given by:
s
τijs,cf 2 = τ̂ij,1971
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Figure 1.11: Fundamental Amenities (2005)

Notes: the figure portrays the calibrated fundamental amenity ūi,2005 in year 2005 for each location i in the world.

Counterfactual Results
In each counterfactual exercise, I impose one of the counterfactual trade matrices
listed in Section 1.6.3 and then compute the counterfactual spatial equilibrium which
includes variables such as counterfactual wages wcf and counterfactual populations
Lcf . Given these variables, I compute the percentage increase in population between
the baseline 2005 equilibrium and the counterfactual equilibrium for each and every
Lcf

i
location i: 100 × ( Li,2005
− 1)%.

Figures 1.12 and 1.13 display the percentage increase in population for every
location in the world for each of the counterfactual exercises. Note that in every
map there are many locations with zero change in population. These are countries
for which we do not have data at the subnational level. They were thus included in
the analysis as single units, which when combined with the assumed cross-country
population immobility implies that their population must remain constant under any
counterfactual trade-cost structure.
When examining the maps in Figure 1.12 and 1.13, one should note that the
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Figure 1.12: Results: Counterfactual CF1 (No-border Crossing Cost)

Notes: for each location in the world, the figure portrays the percentage change in population in the counterfactual equilibrium CF1
(in which I eliminate all border-crossing costs) with respect to the 2005 baseline.

range of percent population changes is modest. For example, in counterfactual CF1
(elimination of border-crossing costs) no location gains more than 5.5% or loses more
than 10% of its baseline population. This implies that, given model parameters and
calibrated fundamentals, trade shocks seem to influence the spatial distribution of
population only moderately. This observation may help explain the result presented
below that changes in trade access account for little of the actually observed change
in concentration in recent decades.
For each counterfactual, which locations grow within a country and which locations shrink? Casual inspection of Figures 1.12 and 1.13 suggests that the geographic
pattern of population changes for counterfactual CF1, where trade costs fall, is the
opposite of the pattern for counterfactual CF2 where trade costs increase. When
we decrease trade costs in CF1, locations that housed a low fraction of the national
population at baseline (e.g. northwestern USA, western China, northwestern Brazil)
tend to be the ones that grow the most, thus reducing population concentration at
the national level. On the other hand, when trade costs rise in CF2, the locations
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Figure 1.13: Results: Counterfactual CF2 (1971 Trade Costs)

Notes: for each location in the world, the figure portrays the percentage change in population in the counterfactual equilibrium CF2
(in which raise trade costs back to their 1971 levels) with respect to the 2005 baseline.

Table 1.2: Correlation of Baseline Population Share and Population Relative Change

Counterfactual


ρ ln(

Lcf
i
Li,2005

), ln( L̄Li,2005 )

CF1


c(i),2005

CF2

-0.227 0.249

Notes: for each counterfactual exercise, the table displays the correlation (across all locations in the world) between the log of the
location’s initial share of the national population (ln(Li,2005 /L̄c(i),2005 )) and the log of the relative change in the location’s population
cf

in the counterfactual equilibrium with respect to baseline (ln(Li /Li,2005 )).

that grow the most tend to be the ones that had a high fraction of the national
population at baseline (e.g. northeastern USA, eastern China, southeastern Brazil),
thereby increasing the spatial concentration of population.
Table 1.2 provides a more systematic assessment of these casual observations. For
each counterfactual exercise, it displays the correlation coefficient between (the log
of) a location’s baseline share of the national population and (the log of) its relative
population change between the baseline and the counterfactual equilibrium. For
counterfactual CF1, which decreases trade costs, the correlation is negative (around
-0.23), while the opposite holds for counterfactual CF2, which increases trade costs
and for which the correlation is positive (around 0.25).
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It short, these results indicate that international trade integration tends to cause
spatial deconcentration of population, while increased trade costs have an opposite,
concentrating effect. Note that this is consistent with the predictions of Krugman
and Livas (1996). Thus, a prediction originally made in a simple stylized model also
seems to hold in a model that is much more sophisticated (including elements such
as structural change and differential access to foreign markets) and that is closely
calibrated to the world economy using real-world data.
Trade Volumes and Welfare
Counterfactual exercises also allow us to predict the effects that each counterfactual
trade shock would have on welfare and on trade volumes. These effects are central
topics of interest in the trade literature. Within that context, this model’s predictions are useful because they come from a full-fledged general equilibrium model that
includes several important mechanisms such as trade diversion, cross-sectoral reallocation, geographic reallocation, and structural change. Therefore, its predictions
regarding welfare and trade volumes are arguably an useful addition to the ones
from traditional models, which often lack mechanisms such as spatial population
reallocation, for example.
The first row of Table 1.3 presents the effect of counterfactual trade-cost structures on trade volumes by displaying the value of international trade as a fraction of
world GDP in each scenario. International trade corresponds to 21% of world GDP
in the calibrated 2005 world economy. Counterfactual exercise CF1, which eliminates international trade costs, has very large effects on trade volumes: trade as a
fraction of world GDP grows by 57 percentage points, reaching 78%. This suggests
that global trade is not close to being completely free, even for practical purposes,
since there is much potential trade that is repressed by currently standing border54

Table 1.3: Change in International Trade (as % of world GDP)

Counterfactual #
Long-Run CF
CF (strong immobility)
CF (weak immobility)

CF1
+57 p.p.
+57 p.p.
+57 p.p.

CF2
-7 p.p.
-5 p.p.
-7 p.p.

Notes: for each counterfactual exercise, the table’s first row displays the counterfactual change in international trade (as a % of world
GDP) with respect to the calibrated 2005 economy. The second and third rows display the corresponding counterfactual change for
the strong-immobility and weak-immobility counterfactuals, respectively, in which the spatial distribution of population is not allowed
to adjust in the counterfactual equilibrium (see Appendix 1.8.5 for details).

crossing costs. Counterfactual CF2, which raises international trade costs to 1971
levels, cause the fraction of trade in global GDP to decline by 7 p.p., reaching 14%.
The first row of Table 1.4 presents the effect of counterfactual trade structures
on welfare by displaying the percent change in the cross-country average of adjusted
welfare sums (variable πc ) in each scenario. Eliminating international trade costs in
counterfactual CF1 yields substantial average welfare increases of 57%. Once again,
the results imply that international trade costs were sufficiently high in 2005 that
there were still major gains to be had from lowering those costs. In that sense,
the process of international trade integration was still not close to being completed.
Increasing international trade costs to 1971 levels in counterfactual CF2 decreases
average welfare by about 5%. Taken at face value, these numbers seem to suggest
that trade integration between the 1970s and the 2000s, albeit meaningful, was very
incomplete. From the perspective of the 1970s, most of the welfare gains and trade
intensification that would occur in a free-trade world had not been materialized by
2005. Therefore, understanding what the remaining trade barriers are and how to
decrease them in order to further trade integration would appear to be a valuable
endeavor.
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Table 1.4: % Change in Cross-country Average of National Welfare

Counterfactual #
Long-Run CF
CF (strong immobility)
CF (weak immobility)

CF1
56.9%
+56.8%
+56.9 %

CF2
-5.1%
-4.4%
-5.1%

Notes: for each counterfactual exercise, the table’s first row displays the counterfactual change in the cross-country average of country-

P

level adjusted welfare sums (πc = (

k∈c

1

Wkθ ) θ ) with respect to the calibrated 2005 economy. The second and third rows display the

corresponding counterfactual change for the strong-immobility and weak-immobility counterfactuals, respectively, in which the spatial
distribution of population is not allowed to adjust in the counterfactual equilibrium (see Appendix 1.8.5 for details).

Table 1.5: Decomposition of Variance of 1990-2005 Changes in Primacy

in %
Var(cont )
0.000002 0.008%
DT A
Var(cont
)
.0002
0.99%
LF
Var(cont )
.0202
103.7%
ST
DT A
2cov(cont , cont
) -0.000005 -.03%
ST
LF
2cov(cont , cont )
.00005
0.25%
DM A
LF
2cov(cont
, cont )
-.001
-4.93%
Var(d ln(P rimacy))
.0195
100%
ST

Notes: the table displays the values of the sample variances and covariances of the terms in equation 1.32, namely the 1990-2005 change
DT A
in primacy (d ln(P rimacyc )) and the contributions of structural transformation (contST
), and
c ), differential trade access (contc
local fundamentals ((contLF
)).
The
values
are
displayed
both
in
absolute
terms
and
as
a
percentage
of
the
variance
of
primacy
changes
c
(Var(d ln(P rimacyc ))).

1.6.4

Decomposition

I also take advantage of the calibrated 2005 model to perform an additional empirical
exercise in which I separate the relative contributions of structural transformation,
changes in differential trade access, and changes in local fundamentals for the 19902005 changes in spatial concentration observed in the data, as measured by the
primacy rate. To do so, I use the methodology described in Section 1.4.4, which
allows me to decompose the variance of (the log of) primacy change in a sample
of 44 countries into multiple components as stated in equation (1.32). Results are
presented in Table 1.5.
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The first two rows of Table 1.5 show that the variances of the impacts of structural
change (Var(contST )) and of differential trade access (Var(contDT A )) are relatively
small, accounting for only around 1% of the total sample variance of primacy changes.
On the other hand, the variance of the impact of local fundamentals (productivities
and amenities) is slightly higher than the total variance of primacy changes. This
is possible because two of the covariances are negative, which allows the sum of
variances to be larger than the total variance of primacy changes.
In any case, the results indicate that the vast majority of the variance in observed
primacy changes can be accounted for by local fundamentals. Therefore, while the
counterfactual results of Section 1.6.3 suggest a potentially substantial influence of
trade access on spatial concentration, in practice it is dwarfed by the magnitude of
changes in productivities and amenities, which end up being dominant. This reinforces the importance of fundamentals in the determination of spatial equilibria, as
emphasized by a more traditional urban economics literature, relative to considerations of access to trade networks and structural transformation that have been the
focus of more recent literatures in spatial economics, trade, and macroeconomics.
Figures 1.14 and 1.15 show 1990-2005 changes in primacy and the contribution of
local fundamentals country-by-country. For example, Figure 1.14 shows that Brazil’s
primacy rate decreased by 0.049 between 1990 and 2005, with changes in local fundamentals accounting for 0.027 (that is, slightly over half) of this decrease. Thus,
in the case of Brazil, changes in differential market access and in local fundamentals
contributed roughly equal parts to the change in primacy. Analogous analyses can be
made for other countries by adequately inspecting Figures 1.14 and 1.15.15 However,
the case of Brazil is atypical since the change in primacy in most countries is almost
15

For completeness, Table 1.7 in Appendix 1.7 presents 2005 primacy rates, 1990-2005 changes in
primacy, and the contribution of structural change, differential trade access, and local fundamentals
for each country in the sample.
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Figure 1.14: Contribution of Local Fundamentals for Primacy Reductions

Notes: the figure displays the value of the 1990-2005 change in the log of primacy (d ln(P rimacyc )) for each country in the sample for
whom this change was negative, as well as the contributions of local fundamentals ((contLF
c )).

entirely explained by changes in local fundamentals. This can be seen by noting
that the values of the golden and gray bars are very close in most countries. This
echoes the results of the variance decomposition, implying that changes in local fundamentals were the dominant factor to explain 1990-2005 changes in concentration
observed in the sample.

1.7

Conclusion

In this paper, I investigate the drivers of spatial concentration, disentangling the
contributions of three different factors: structural transformation, differential trade
access, and location-specific fundamentals (i.e. exogenous productivities and ameni-
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Figure 1.15: Contribution of Local Fundamentals for Primacy Increases

Notes: the figure displays the value of the 1990-2005 change in the log of primacy (d ln(P rimacyc )) for each country in the sample for
whom this change was positive, as well as the contributions of local fundamentals ((contLF
c )).

ties). To do so, I augment a modern quantitative spatial model (Allen and Arkolakis
(2014), Allen and Donaldson (2020)) with non-homothetic PIGL preferences (Eckert and Peters (2018)), obtaining a two-sector spatial model that features the three
driving factors of concentration, which is measured by the primacy rate, namely, the
fraction of a country’s population that lives in its largest city. I show that changes in
the primacy rate can be analytically decomposed into separate terms reflecting the
contribution of the the three drivers.
To assess the relative importance of these factors in practice, I develop a methodology to bring the model to the data in two steps: first, I use global data on transportation infrastructure, international and intranational trade to estimate sectorand year-specific bilateral trade costs between 1962 and 2019; second, I use location-
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level data on population, sectoral employment and per capita income to calibrate
the spatial model to the 2005 global economy, which is composed of 1611 locations
across 192 countries. The calibrated model can be used to study the influence of
trade access on spatial concentration through counterfactual exercises in which I impose two alternative trade-cost structures on the 2005 world economy: eliminating
international trade costs, and raising trade costs back to their 1971 levels. Moreover,
an additional empirical exercise allows me to use the analytical expression mentioned above to decompose the variance of observed 1990-2005 primacy changes in
a sample of 44 countries into components reflecting the relative roles of structural
transformation, differential trade access, and local fundamentals.
Counterfactual results suggest that the net effect of lowering international trade
costs is deconcentrating for most countries. For example, the substantial decline in
international trade costs between the 1970s and 2000s had a non-negligible negative
effect on spatial concentration by increasing the populations of locations that were
initially more empty at the expensive of initially populous locations. However, results of the decomposition exercise show that, from an accounting perspective, the
vast majority of the variance in the primacy changes actually observed in the data
between 1990 and 2005 can be explained by changes in local fundamentals, that is,
in exogenous productivities and amenities. Structural transformation and changes
in trade access account for only approximately 1% of the total variance. Therefore,
although these two factors may have had significant effects on concentration, in practice their magnitude appears to have been small enough to be dominated by changes
in local fundamentals.
A limitation of the paper are the assumptions governing agent migration. Namely,
I assume that migration is costless within countries and infinitely costly across countries. It should be possible to relax this strong assumption by extending the empirical
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methodology and gathering more migration data (both within and across countries).
This would yield a more complete model of the world economy and also open up the
possibility of international labor reallocation as a response to shocks in trade costs
and other variables, thereby enriching our understanding of the mechanisms through
which the effects of these shocks operate. Another limitation is that most parameters
I used were borrowed from the literature rather than estimated within the context of
the model, which would be preferable. By conveniently gathering additional data on
population and income per capita for additional time periods and by wisely choosing
instrumental variables that provide sources of exogenous variation to international
trade costs (e.g. policy-driven trade liberalizations), it should be possible to estimate
some of the model’s parameters using an instrumental-variable approach similar in
spirit to Adao et al. (2020).

1.8
1.8.1

Appendix
Calibrating Traversal Costs

In Section 1.4.1, I mention that I build the world transportation cost raster using
transportation-specific traversal costs that were adapted from Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). Here I give a more detailed explanation of this procedure. I do that in
two steps. First, I present a general microfoundation of trade costs that justifies
an exponential form for these costs. Then, by comparing this formula to formulae
derived in Allen and Arkolakis (2014), I map the traversal cost variable in my model
to the equivalent variables in their model, thus clarifying the relationship between the
two and allowing me to borrow their values in a relatively straightforward manner,
given the appropriate adaptations.
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1.8.2

Microfoundations of Trade Costs

Assume that a truck is carrying an iceberg between points i and j through a continuous path T , with points along the path indexed by variable x. The iceberg’s
melting rate is 1 − r(x) per hour. Thus, at the end of each hour only a fraction
r(x) of the iceberg mass at the start of the hour remains. The instantaneous truck
speed is given by function s(x). Note that I allow the melting rate and truck speed
to vary along different points of the path. I also assume both functions r and s are
continuous.
Divide the complete path from i to j into a finite number B of segments indexed by
k = 1, ..., B, with corresponding lengths [dx1 , ...dxB ]. Given an initial quantity of ice
q0 , the final quantity of ice when the iceberg arrives at final point j is approximately
equal to:

qf ≈ q0

B
Y

dxk

r(xk ) s(xk )

(1.33)

k=1

where xk is an arbitrarily chosen point in segment k.
Note that τij , the conventionally defined multiplicative “iceberg” trade cost between i and j, is equivalent to q0 /qf in this formulation. To find the exact value of
q0 /qf , I take the expression in equation 1.33 to the limit as we divide the path into
a higher and higher number (B → ∞) of smaller and smaller segments (dxk → 0+
for k = 1, ..., B):

τij =

B
Y
1
q0
= lim
r(xk ) s(xk )
dx→0
qf
k=1



dxk



1

= πij r(x) s(x)

dx

(1.34)

where the symbol π indicates the geometric integral. By the properties of the geometric integral, it then follows that:
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Rj

τij = e

i

1

ln(r(x) s(x) )dx

=e

Rj

1
i s(x)

ln(r(x))dx

Therefore, I have found an expression for the iceberg trade cost between two
regions that is a function only of a regular integral that is taken over an expression
depending only the speed function (s) and the net-of-melting rate (r). This expression forms the basis for the calibration of the (mode-specific) traversal costs of the
next section.

1.8.3

Mode-Specific Traversal Costs

In this section, I calibrate values for the mode-specific traversal costs used in Section
1.4.1. I do that by drawing a parallel between my derived equation 1.8.2 and the
mode-specific costs estimated by Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
First consider equation (22) in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). Assuming a single
mode of transportation m and setting bm = 0 and θ = 1, we get that the model
transportation cost is proportional to T (i, j) = eam dm (i,j) . Now, consider that dm (i, j)
can be represented as an integral

Rj
i

τmode (x)dx, where x indexes the points along the

path and τmode (x) is the relative slowness of that mode of transportation on that
point. Comparing this expression to equation 1.8.2, we can then draw the following
parallel:

am τmode (x) =

1
ln(r(x))
s(x)

Therefore, I can take the values for mode-specific variable costs am from the first
row of Table II of Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and adjust them by a representative
of τmode (x), which I take from their Appendix B3, to obtain a measure of the modespecific traversal cost which I use in the main analysis.
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1.8.4

Robustness of Gravity Results

Alternative Data Set: GSV
In my main estimates of the gravity equation (see Sections 1.4.1 and 1.6.1), I use
the WITS trade data described in Section 1.5.3. One disadvantage of this data set
is that it does not include data at the subnational level nor intranational trade data
at the country level. Since my main parameter of interest in the gravity estimation
(namely, the border-crossing cost) is identified by comparing intranational to international trade flows in a given period (see Section 1.4.1), I must deal with these
data limitations by imputing WITS intranational trade flows at the country level (as
explained in Section 1.5.3 above). Therefore, identification of border-crossing costs
is partially based on imputed data, which may be unsatisfactory. In that aspect, it
would be preferable to have non-imputed data on intracountry trade flows.
To partially allay these concerns, I perform a robustness check in which I repeat
gravity estimation for year 2010 using an alternative data source that does include
trade flows at the subnational and within-country levels. By verifying that gravity results under WITS and this alternative data set are qualitatively similar, one
becomes more confident in using WITS data in the main analysis.
This alternative data set data set is the German Survey Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030 (GSV), which covers bilateral trade flows in euros across 249 regions
within 24 European countries, plus 16 non-European countries and regions.1617 Unfortunately, unlike WITS, the data only covers year 2010. Thus, we can think of
GSV as being richer but less comprehensive than WITS.
16

Flows are converted into US dollar using the exchange rate of 1.33 USD per euro from:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/412794/
17
Trade flows are reported at the level of 15 disaggregated sectors. I classify sector ss1 (“Agriculture”) as agriculture and the remaining sectors ss2 -ss15 as non-agricultural

64

To permit comparability across WITS and GSV data, I adjust GSV bilateral
trade flows to be consistent with WITS. Specifically, I first aggregate GSV flows
“up” to the country level and compare these aggregated flows to the corresponding
WITS flows. Then, for each origin-country by destination-country by sector triplet,
I multiply the original GSV trade flows by a constant such that the adjusted GSV
flows match the corresponding WITS flows at the country level. Formally:

Xijs,GSV1 = Xijs,GSV0 P

s,W IT S
Xc(i),c(j)
i∈c(i)

P

j∈c(j)

Xijs,GSV0

where Xijs,GSV1 is the final, adjusted value of GSV sector-s trade flows from location
s,W IT S
i to location j, Xijs,GSV0 is the corresponding raw, unadjusted value, and Xc(i),c(j)
is

the value of sector-s trade flows from country c(i) to country c(j).
Results: Comparing WITS to GSV (2010)
I now present results of running trade gravity regressions for year 2010 only separately for WITS and GSV data sets. I then compare the estimated trade-cost
structures implied by these alternative methods, verifying that they yield qualitatively (and, to some extent, quantitatively) comparable results. This gives further
credence to the decision of proceeding with the main analysis using the WITS data.
Figures 1.16-1.17 presents estimates of the sector-level costs of distance bins,
{C s,z }B
z=1 , for each of the two data sets (WITS and GSV). The figures show that
the estimates are quite similar for the non-agricultural sector, although less so for
agriculture.
A
N
Table 1.6 presents estimated sector-level border-crossing parameters (Ê2010
,Ê2010
)

for each data source. For the non-agricultural sector, the border-crossing estimate is
N
N
very similar: Ê2010
= 3.73 for the GSV data set versus Ê2010
= 3.81 for the WITS
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Figure 1.16: Estimated Cost of Distance Bins, Agriculture (2010)

Notes: the figure portrays the estimated values of the agricultural distance cost Ĉ A,z in year 2010 for each distance bin z ∈ {0, ..., B}
for each of two data sets: the “simple” data set refers to the WITS trade data set (which is the same data I used in the main gravity
estimation of Section 1.6.1), and the “rich” data set refers to the German survey data set Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030 (GSV),
which covers multiple European countries and their subnational units for year 2010 only.

data. Note that these are very high costs: an estimate of 3.81 is equivalent to an
ad-valorem tariff of 281%. For the agricultural sector, estimates are lower and also
A
A
not that similar across data sets: Ê2010
= 1.87 for GSV versus Ê2010
= 2.39 for

WITS. However, they are qualitatively in the same ballpark. Moreover, part of the
difference could be explained by differences in sample coverage: WITS covers the
whole world while GSV is mostly restricted to European countries.
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Figure 1.17: Estimated Cost of Distance Bins, Non-Agriculture (2010)

Notes: the figure portrays the estimated values of the non-agricultural distance cost Ĉ N,z in year 2010 for each distance bin z ∈
{0, ..., B} for each of two data sets: the “simple” data set refers to the WITS trade data set (which is the same data I used in the
main gravity estimation of Section 1.6.1), and the “rich” data set refers to the German survey data set Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose
2030 (GSV), which covers multiple European countries and their subnational units for year 2010 only.

1.8.5

“Immobility” Counterfactuals

Counterfactual exercises allow us to better understand the effects of changes in trade
access not only on the spatial distribution of population, but also on welfare and on
the volume of international trade (see Sections 1.4.3, 1.6.3 and 1.6.3). Additionally,
these exercises also allow me to investigate the extent to which this spatial reallocation itself works as a contributing mechanism to the effects on welfare and trade
volume. In other words: if spatial reallocation in reaction to trade shocks is not allowed to take place, does the final effect of trade shocks on welfare and trade volumes
look very different?
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Table 1.6: Estimated Border-Crossing Parameters (2010)

A
Ê2010
N
Ê2010
N
WITS data?
GSV data?

“Rich”
“Simple”
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1.871
2.39
3.73
3.81
32,483 34,165 18,357 18,394
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

A
N
Notes: the table displays the estimated values of the agricultural and non-agricultural border-crossing costs Ê2010
and Ê2010
in year
2010 for each of two data sets: the “simple” data set refers to the WITS trade data set (which is the same data I used in the main
gravity estimation of Section 1.6.1), and the “rich” data set refers to the German survey data set Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030
(GSV), which covers multiple European countries and their subnational units for year 2010 only.

My framework provides a convenient setting to study this question. For each
counterfactual trade-cost matrix τ cf , I can compute an “immobility” counterfactual
equilibrium, in addition to the “long-run” counterfactual equilibrium computed with
the methodology of Section 1.4.3. In this immobility counterfactual, I compute
the equilibrium distribution of wages wcf,I (and potentially sector-level population
Lcf,I,A ,Lcf,I,N ) under counterfactual trade-cost matrix τ cf while keeping the spatial
population distribution fixed at 2005 levels (i.e. Lcf,I
= Li,2005 for all locations i).
i
In other words, I allow wages but not population to adjust in response to the tradecost shock. In that sense, immobility counterfactuals can be interpreted either as a
short run equilibrium (in which workers have not yet had enough time to reallocate)
or as a long-run equilibrium in which severe mobility frictions stop workers from
reallocating.
Immobility counterfactuals come in two versions: in the strong immobility counterfactual I do not allow population to reallocate either across sectors or locations,
while in the weak immobility counterfactual I allow population to reallocate across
sectors but not across locations. Formally, a strong-immobility counterfactual equilibrium is obtained by solving the following equation system for variables (wcf,SI,A ,
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wcf,SI,N , P cf,SI,A , P cf,SI,N ,υ cf,SI,A ):

(wicf,SI,s )σs (Lsi,2005 )1−αs (σs −1) = (Āsi,2005 )σs −1
X

(τijcf,s )1−σs (Pjcf,SI,s )σs −1

j∈S

(Pjcf,SI,s )1−σs =

X

X

υjcf,SI,s×r Lrj,2005 wjcf,SI,r

r∈{A,N }

s
(τ̂ij,2005
wicf,SI,s )1−σs (Āsi,2005 (Lsi,2005 )αs )σs −1

i∈S

υjcf,SI,A×s = φ + ν(Pjcf,SI,A /Pjcf,SI,N )γ (wjcf,SI,s )−η
Note that wages are now allowed to vary by sector, owing to the fact that workers
cannot reallocate across sectors. Therefore, wage differences across sectors within a
given location are not arbitraged away by workers moving from the lower-wage to the
higher-wage sector. Mathematically, since sector-level populations (LA , LN ) are not
“free” variables anymore, it is necessary to allow wage vectors to vary by sector so
that goods market-clearing equations can simultaneously hold for the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors. Moreover, in the right-hand side of these marketclearing equations there is now an internal summation term across sectors. This
is necessary to separately account for the demand from a location’s agricultural and
non-agricultural workers. This demand may differ across the two groups of workers
because their wages (and hence agricultural shares of consumption expenditure) may
now be different.
A weak-immobility counterfactual equilibrium can similarly be obtained by solving the following equation system for variables (wcf,W I , P cf,W I,A , P cf,W I,N ,υ cf,W I,A ):
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I,s 1−αs (σs −1)
(wicf,W I )σs (Lcf,W
)
=
i

(Āsi,2005 )σs −1

X

(τijcf,s )1−σs (Pjcf,W I,s )σs −1 υjcf,W I,s Lj,2005 wjcf,W I

j∈S

(Pjcf,W I,s )1−σs =

X

I,s αs σs −1
(τijcf,s wicf,W I )1−σs (Āsi,2005 (Lcf,W
) )
i

i∈S

υjcf,W I,A = φ + ν(Pjcf,W I,A /Pjcf,W I,N )γ (wjcf,W I )−η

I,A
I,N
Li,2005 = Lcf,W
+ Lcf,W
i
i

Note that, unlike in the strong-immobility counterfactual, the weak-immobility
counterfactual forces wages to be the same for both sectors in a given location. This is
possible because sector-level populations are allowed to reallocate from one sector to
the other within a given location, thus arbitraging away any cross-sectoral differences
in wages.
For either the strong- or weak-immobility counterfactual, it is relatively straightforward to compute the effect of trade shocks on welfare (π cf,SI ,π cf,W I ) and trade
volume (( M
)cf,SI , ( M
)cf,W I ,( M
)cf,SI,W LD ,( M
)cf,W I,W LD ) using similar equations to
Y
Y
Y
Y
(1.28)-(1.30). I can then compare these effects to their counterparts in the long-run
counterfactual and assess how much of the effect of trade-cost shocks on welfare and
trade volumes is mediated by population reallocation. That is, I can uncover the
extent to which trade-induced labor reallocation contributes to the increase in trade
volumes and gains from trade brought about by trade integration.
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Results of Immobility Counterfactuals
As described in the last section, I rerun each counterfactual exercise without allowing
population to reallocate geographically (“weak” immobility) or without allowing it
to reallocate either geographically or across sectors (“strong” immobility). For each
of these exercises, I compute the counterfactual fraction of international trade in
world GDP and the counterfactual cross-country average of adjusted welfare sums
(πc ) and present them in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively.
For each of the two tables, both the strong and weak immobility rows have very
similar results to the long-run counterfactual row. For example, while increasing
trade costs to 1971 levels decreases the cross-country average of adjusted welfare
sums by 5.1% when mobility is allowed, the corresponding decrease is 4.4% and 5.1%
with strong and weak immobility, respectively. That same counterfactual increase
in trade costs decreases the fraction of trade in world GDP from 21% to 14% when
mobility is allowed, whereas this fraction falls to 16% and 14% when assuming strong
and weak immobility, respectively.
Therefore, given parameters and the exogenous variables calibrated to the 2005
economy, the results imply that internal mobility within countries and across sectors
are relatively secondary factors mediating the effects of trade-cost shocks on both
trade volumes and welfare. In other words, when observing the world through the
lens of this model, we conclude that the reallocation of workers across sectors and
locations does not seem to be a major mechanism contributing to the effects of
international trade integration on trade volumes and on national welfare levels.
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1.8.6

Details of the Decomposition Exercise

Calibrating the 1990 Economy
As explained in Sections 1.4.4 and 1.6.4, I use the calibrated model to perform a decomposition exercise in which I separate the contributions of structural transformation, differential market access, and local fundamentals in explaining the 1990-2005
changes in my measure of spatial concentration (i.e. the primacy rate) observed in
the data. As explained above, doing so requires knowledge of calibrated fundamentals (ū, ĀA , ĀN ) and variables (υ A , I, ΠA , ΠN ) not only for 2005 but also for 1990.
Therefore, to obtain these variables I must separately calibrate the model to the
global 1990 economy.
Calibration procedures and data sources for 1990 are remarkably similar to the
ones for 2005, which were described in sections 1.4.2 and 1.5. In particular, I use
IPUMS International data for population and sectoral employment and G-Econ 4.0
data for per capita income. IPUMS data on the population share of each location
within a country is taken from 1990 or from the closest available year (as long as
that year is between 1985 and 1995). The final 1990 calibration sample features 1152
locations across 188 countries. The substantial difference in the number of locations
with respect to the 2005 sample is explained by the fact that IPUMS International
covers fewer countries at the subnational level in 1990 compared to 2005.
Decomposition Results: Country-by-Country
Table 1.7 presents complete results for the decomposition exercise of Section 1.6.4
for each country. Specifically, the table displays the primacy rate in 2005, the 19902005 change in (the log of) the primacy rate, and the contributions of structural
DT A
transformation (contST
), and local fundamentals
c ), differential trade access (contc
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(contLF
c ).
As an example, consider the case of Brazil. Its log primacy rate decreased by
0.049 between 1990 and 2005, leading to a 2005 primacy rate of 0.227. Changes
in differential market access and in local fundamentals contributed roughly equal
LF
A
parts to this change in primacy (contDT
BRA = 0.022, contBRA = 0.027), with structural

change having a much smaller influence (contST
BRA ≈ 0). However, for most countries,
the fraction of the primacy change accounted for by local fundamentals is much
higher. For example, the change in log primacy in Argentina was -0.342, with -0.334
(97.6%) of that being accounted for changes in local fundamentals. Similar analyses
can be performed for other countries by inspecting Table 1.7.
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Table 1.7: Countries’ Primacies and Contributing Factors
Country
Argentina
Austria
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Benin
Ecuador
El Salvador
Fiji
France
Greece
Guatemala
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Jamaica
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Romania
Vietnam
Spain
Switzerland
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Egypt
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia

P rimacyc,2005
0.371
0.203
0.295
0.193
0.227
0.384
0.345
0.092
0.229
0.112
0.649
0.332
0.427
0.206
0.268
0.291
0.201
0.288
0.242
0.230
0.284
0.182
0.138
0.130
0.330
0.567
0.279
0.355
0.054
0.203
0.728
0.094
0.107
0.173
0.184
0.090
0.875
0.186
0.198
0.144
0.117
0.455
0.120
0.304

d ln(P rimacyc ) contST
c
-0.342
0.000
-0.029
-0.000
-0.005
0.000
0.060
-0.000
-0.049
-0.000
0.005
-0.000
-0.029
-0.000
-0.091
-0.000
-0.048
0.000
-0.111
-0.000
0.018
-0.000
-0.052
0.000
0.076
-0.000
-0.061
0.000
0.036
0.001
0.090
-0.000
-0.037
0.001
-0.103
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.112
0.000
0.286
-0.000
-0.101
0.001
0.111
-0.001
-0.082
-0.000
0.041
-0.000
0.129
0.000
0.205
0.000
0.052
0.000
0.210
0.008
-0.032
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.003
0.001
-0.030
0.000
-0.020
0.000
0.016
0.000
-0.034
0.001
-0.031
0.000
0.212
0.000
-0.456
0.000
-0.369
0.000
-0.037
-0.000
-0.026
-0.000
-0.212
0.002
0.047
0.000

A
contDT
c
-0.008
-0.003
-0.003
-0.003
-0.022
-0.002
-0.007
0.011
-0.012
-0.003
-0.005
-0.024
-0.001
-0.002
-0.014
-0.035
-0.006
-0.003
-0.001
-0.012
-0.009
-0.000
-0.011
-0.032
-0.035
-0.012
-0.029
-0.017
-0.016
-0.005
0.000
-0.027
-0.002
-0.005
-0.001
-0.062
0.001
-0.037
-0.022
0.000
0.000
-0.010
-0.016
0.006

contLF
c
-0.334
-0.026
-0.002
0.064
-0.027
0.007
-0.022
-0.101
-0.036
-0.108
0.023
-0.028
0.077
-0.059
0.049
0.125
-0.032
-0.100
0.001
-0.100
0.296
-0.102
0.123
-0.050
0.075
0.141
0.234
0.069
0.219
-0.027
0.026
0.028
-0.028
-0.015
0.017
0.027
-0.031
0.249
-0.434
-0.370
-0.037
-0.015
-0.198
0.041

Notes: for each country in the sample of the decomposition exercise, the table displays the primacy rate in 2005, the change in the log
of primacy between 1990 and 2005 (d ln(P rimacyc )), and the contributions of structural transformation (contST
c ), differential trade
A
access (contDT
), and local fundamentals (contLF
c
c ).
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Chapter 2
Non-Tariff Barriers in a Quantitative
Trade Model

2.1

Introduction

To what extent do non-tariff barriers (NTBs) influence the amount of international
trade across countries? The literature on international trade has gone a long way in
investigating the effects of geography (e.g. distance), infrastructure, and some policy
factors (e.g. tariffs) on the amount of trade among countries (or regions within a
country). However, there is comparatively much less work on the effects of NTBs
on trade.1 One challenge is that while it is relatively straightforward to measure
tariffs and incorporate them tractably into theoretical models (e.g. through the
commonplace “iceberg” trade-cost formulation), that is more difficult for NTBs.
Nevertheless, NTBs are arguably important. It is speculated that NTBs could
help explain the phenomenon of “missing trade”, whereby we observe less trade in
1

NTBs are typically defined to include mechanisms such as quotas, bans, import licensing,
phyto-sanitary conditions, quality standards, rules of origin, among other regulations.
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the data than what would apper to be suggested by influencial theoretical trade
models (Trefler (1995)). Perhaps the literature could be neglecting the influence of
non-tariff obstacles, which could then account for part of this missing trade. Therefore, potential methodologies that would help us measure the size and relevance of
NTBs would be highly desirable. In this paper, I attemp to make progress in that
direction by developing a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates NTBs
into a workhorse quantitative trade model and which can then be estimated using
real-world data, thus allowing us to indirectly infer the size of NTBs from the data.
I start by presenting a framework that extends the classic Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model to include import licenses, a type of NTB. In the model, a consumer
must obtain an import license from her government before she imports goods from
abroad. She obtains the license randomly with a certain probability. I show which
results from the original Eaton-Kortum model change and which do not due to this
extension. In particular, I derive new formulas for bilateral trade flows, price indices,
and the conditional and unconditional price distributions. One important difference
with respect to Eaton-Kortum is the breakdown of their result that the distribution
of prices paid for imports versus domestic goods are equivalent. When a country has
import licenses in place, the realized prices are lower for imports, on average, because
some potentially profitable international exchanges are not allowed to happen by the
licensing system, diverting the consumer towards the more expensive domestic good.
As a result, a “price gap” emerges between the average domestic good and the average
imported good. Similarly, the new equations for trade shares and for the measure of
goods imported from each country also reflect an asymmetry between domestic and
imported goods.
I then present an empirical methodology to use the model to compute the intensity
of NTBs, which are represented in the model by the probability that the consumer ob76

tains an import license from her government. I show that we can rewrite the model’s
equilibrium equations in such a way that the resulting system contains only three
unobserved variables (NTBs, productivities, and iceberg trade costs) in addition to
variables that can be directly observed in commonplace data sets, estimated beforehand, or borrowed from the literature. I then argue that the system has an unique
solution for these unobserved variables given knowledge of the observables. That
is, we can use the model to “invert out” the unobserved variables, including NTBs,
given parameters and data on relative price indices, price gaps, wages, populations,
and trade flows. Intuitively, this model is identified because it simultaneously adds
a new set of variables (namely, the NTBs) add a new set of equilibrium conditions
(namely, the price-gap equations) to the workhorse Eaton-Kortum trade model. In
that sense, my methodological approach is similar in spirit to the “wedges” literature
(e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)) in the sense that I back out a variable of interest
from “gaps” observed in the data that can be rationalized by that variable.
While data on wages, populations, trade flows, and (to a lesser extent) price indices is widely disseminated and commonly used in the trade literature, data on price
gaps between domestic and imported goods is not. I thus propose an econometric
approach to estimate these price gaps. The core idea is that the price gap for a
given country can be identified by comparing varieties’ average prices for domestic
versus imported goods, and then averaging across varieties. I propose a relatively
straighforward implementation of this strategy that leverages a fixed-effects equation
to extract country-level estimates of average prices separately for domestic and imported goods, whose exponentiated difference then yields an estimate of country-level
price gaps. These price-gap estimates can then be used as an input to implement
the model inversion described above, thus guaranteeing the feasibility of the overall
empirical methodology given appropriate data.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical model, including some important
results concerning equilibrium trade flows and price distributions. Section 2.4 explain
the empirical methodology that I propose to estimate the model on real-world data
and recover estimates of NTBs. Section 2.5 proposes an econometric fixed-effects
approach to estimate measures of price gaps which can then be used as key inputs
in the main empirical methodology. Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2

Related Literature

There are at least three main strands of literature that relate to this paper. First,
there exists a literature that directly studies NTBs (either directly or in passing),
including Harrigan (1993), Trefler (1993), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Anderson and
Neary (1996), Deardorff and Stern (1998), Head and Ries (2001), Messerlin (2001),
Anderson and Neary (2003), and Mobarak and Purbasari (2006). This literature
usually takes either one of two approaches to measure NTBs: price gaps between
domestic and imported prices, or “coverage ratios” (i.e. the fraction of goods lines
that are legally subject to import licenses by a country). While price gaps also feature
prominently in my paper, I incorporate them into a modern quantitative generalequilibrium trade model, which no other papers do, to the best of my knowledge.
Second, since my paper is directly based on Eaton and Kortum (2002), it follows
a rich recent literature on quantitative trade models (Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008),
Dekle et al. (2007), Arkolakis et al. (2012), Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014),
Caliendo and Parro (2015)). I see this paper as expanding the scope of this literature
by creating a way to tractably incorporate NTBs into these models in way that allows
them to be readily estimated using real-world data.
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Third, my paper is similar in spirit to the indirect “wedges” approach (Hsieh
and Klenow (2009)) since it uses price gaps to infer the magnitude of potential
economic distortions. However, I use this approach specifically to estimate NTBs,
which is an application for which it had not been used so far, as far as I know.
Relatedly, Caliendo et al. (2020) also use the strategy of model “inversion” to back
out measures of frictions from worldwide data. However, their approach is more
general, with frictions including physical trade costs, distortions, and shifters in
demand from intermediate inputs, while I focus more narrowly on non-tariff barriers
to international trade.

2.3

Framework

In this section, I present my theoretical framework, which is based on the model in
Eaton and Kortum (2002). My main departure from that model is that before a
consumer in a given country can import a good from a foreign country, she must ask
her government for an import license, which may be given to her with probability
lower than one. These import licenses can represent the more general concept of
NTBs in the context of the model because they exhibit a common characteristic of
NTBs: they destroy potentially profitable international transactions in a way that
cannot be overcome by charging or paying higher prices.
The model’s general setup is the same as in the Eaton-Kortum model. There
is a set S containing N countries, which are indexed by n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }. In this
version of the model, each country is represented by a single point in space but it is
relatively straightforward to extend it to feature multiple regions per country. The
population of a country n is fixed and represented by L̄n .
The following subsections within this Section 2.3 explain the details of the model.
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2.3.1

Agents

The population of each country n is composed of agents who work and consume (i.e.
workers-consumers). They consume a continuum of goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], with
an utility function given by the following constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
aggregator:


Un = 

Z 1
j=0



cn (j)

σ−1
σ

dj 

σ
σ−1

(2.1)

where cn (j) is the quantity (in physical units) of goods of variety j consumed by
each consumer in location n, and σ > 1 is a parameter representing the elasticity of
substitution across goods. Each individual agent in country n supplies one unit of
labor inelastically, earning the local wage wn .
Although each good j is supplied by producers in all countries, a consumer in
country n must have an import license to buy from a foreign country. The license
is obtained stochastically: a “coin” is flipped by the government, which results in
the consumer obtaining an import license with probability Kn ∈ [0, 1]. If the person
obtains the license, then she is allowed to source goods from whichever supplier they
wish, anywhere in the world. If she does not get the license, she can only source
goods from suppliers within her own country. I further assume that it is not possible
to domestically resell imported goods in a “secondary market” (i.e. a no-arbitrage
condition). Thus, the prices of domestic and imported versions of the same variety
can differ in equilibrium.
For a given variety j, a consumer who obtained a license will observe the menu of
prices charged by suppliers of each country and select the cheapest one. Therefore,
for that variety j, she will face an unit price pn (j) = pw
n (j) ≡ mini∈S {pni (j)}, where
pni (j) is the price that a seller of a variety j from country i charges to sell a unit of
the good to a consumer in country n. On the other hand, the unlucky consumer who
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did not obtain a license will have no option but to buy variety j from a domestic
producer, thus facing the domestic price pn (j) = pdn (j) ≡ pnn (j). In any case, after
learning about the unit prices {pn (j)}1j=0 she is facing, she maximizes her utility by
choosing consumption bundle {cn (j)}1j=0 subject to the following budget constraint:
Z 1
j=0

2.3.2

pn (j)cn (j) = wn

(2.2)

Firms

For each country i ∈ S and variety j ∈ [0, 1], a continuum of firms produces this
variety using a linear productive technology with labor as its sole input. The corresponding production function is given by:

Qi (j) = zi (j)li (j)

(2.3)

where Qi (j) is the quantity produced, zi (j) is a variety- and country-specific productivity parameter (taken as given by firms) and li (j) is the firm’s labor input.
The monetary cost of hiring each worker is the local wage wi , and the price of each
unit sold to a customer in country n ∈ S is given by pni (j). In order to sell to this
consumer in country n, the firm must also pay an “iceberg” trade cost dni ≥ 1, with
dnn = 1 for all n ∈ S.
The productivity term zi (j) is a random variable distributed according to the
following Frechet statistical distribution:
Pr(zi (j) ≤ z) = exp



− Ti z −θ



(2.4)

where Ti is a country-specific parameter related to the average productivity (across
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varieties) in country i, and θ is a parameter that governs the dispersion of the distribution of zi (j). The set of random variables {zi (j)}i,j are independently distributed
across varieties j and countries i.
There is perfect competition among firms in goods markets and local labor markets, thus local wages and goods prices are taken as given by each firm. Additionally,
since the production technology has constant returns to scale, any firms that produce must be making zero profits in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium price of
variety j sold by a seller in country i to a buyer in country n must be given by the
following expression:
pni (j) =

2.3.3

wi dni τni
zi (j)

(2.5)

Price Distribution

I now proceed to state theoretical results regarding the distribution of prices. These
results are closely related to well-established results from the literature (Eaton and
Kortum (2002)), so I will relegate their derivation to the Appendix. But before
showing the results, it is useful to define a few terms that will help make notation
more brief:


Φni ≡ Ti wi dni

−θ

Φdn ≡ Φnn
Φfn ≡

X

Φni

(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)

i6=n

Φn ≡ Φdn + Φfn

(2.9)

Intuitively, the term Φni represents the competitiveness of sellers from country i in
the consumer market of country n. It is increasing in the productivity of the seller
country (Ti ) and decreasing in its wages (wi ) and in trade costs (dni ). The terms Φdn
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and Φfn respectively denote the competitiveness of domestic and foreign suppliers in
country n. Finally, Φn denote the “total” competitiveness of all worldwide suppliers
to country n, or alternatively the degree of market access of its consumers (assuming
a completely free international market, with no NTBs).
I now state that the conditional distribution of prices faced by a consumer in
country n who did not obtain an import license is given by the following expression:
Gdn (p) ≡ Pr(pn (j) ≤ p|no license) = Pr(pdn (j) ≤ p) = 1 − e−p

θ Φd
n

(2.10)

Proof. Please check Appendix 2.7.1.
Next, an analogous derivation shows that the consumer in country n who did
obtain an import license faces the following conditional price distribution:
w
−p
Gw
n (p) ≡ Pr(pn (j) ≤ p|license) = Pr(pn (j) ≤ p) = 1 − e

θΦ

n

(2.11)

Note that equations (2.6) and (2.8) imply that Φfn > 0. It then results that
d
Φn > Φdn by equation (2.9). This in turn implies that Gw
n (p) > Gn (p) for all p. That

is, the conditional price distribution without licenses Gdn first-order stochastically
dominates its “with-license” counterpart, Gw
n . Intuitively, prices are lower for the
consumer who obtains an important license because this license allows her to shop
around the world for lower prices, thus obtaining better “bargains” than the consumer
without a license.
Taking equations (2.10) and (2.11) into account, and considering that a license
is obtained with probability Kn , it can be straightforwardly shown that the (unconditional) distribution of prices faced by the consumer in country n is given by the
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following expression:
−pθ Φdn

Gn (p) ≡ Pr(pn (j) ≤ p) = 1 − exp



1 − Kn 1 − e

−pθ Φfn

!

(2.12)

Note that when Kn = 0, the unconditional price distribution Gn collapses to the
conditional price distribution without licenses, Gdn . Similarly, when Kn = 1, the
unconditional price distribution Gn collapses to the conditional price distribution
with licenses, Gw
n . As NTBs become less stringent and the probability of obtaining a
license converges to one, the price distribution faced by the consumer becomes more
and more similar to the (cheaper) price distribution in the global market and less
similar to the (more expensive) price distribution offered by domestic producers.

2.3.4

Trade Flows

In this section, I derive a closed-form expression for trade flows, which I will use later
when proposing a methodology to bring the model to the data. To do that, I first
deriving analytical expressions for the “measure of goods” πni that country n buys
from country i, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). In other words, πni is the fraction
of the continuum of varieties [0,1] that consumers from country n buy from sellers
from country i. The measure of goods can be writen as follows:
Φni
, ∀ i 6= n
Φn

(2.13)

Φdn
+ (1 − Kn )
Φn

(2.14)

πni = Kn

πnn = Kn
Proof. Please check Appendix 2.7.3

Note that πni is not the same as the fraction of their income that consumers

84

from n spend on goods from i. In Eaton and Kortum (2002), these two quantities
happen to coincide because the distribution of prices faced by consumers in country
n conditional on actually buying from country i is the same for all seller countries i.
This does not happen in my model. The breakdown of Eaton-Kortum’s equivalence
result happens because, in some situations, not being able to obtain an import license
means that a cheaper purchase from a foreign supplier is forcebly forfeited in favor of
a more expensive domestic purchase. This implies that the prices actually paid for
domestic purchases will tend to be higher than the corresponding prices for imported
goods.
So if the distribution of prices faced by consumers in country n conditional on
actually buying from country i does not necessarily equal the unconditional distribution Gn , then what is it? It can be shown that this distribution can be written as
follows:
Kn Φdn (1 − e−p Φn ) + (1 − Kn )Φn (1 − e−p
Kn Φdn + (1 − Kn )Φn
θ

Pr(pni (j) ≤ p|n buys from n) =

θ Φd
n

)

(2.15)
Pr(pni (j) ≤ p|n buys from i) = 1 − exp−p

θΦ
n

, ∀i 6= n

(2.16)

Proof. Please check Appendix 2.7.4.
Given the expressions for conditional price distributions presented in equations
(2.15) and (2.16), one can use the same line of reasoning underlying the derivation
of equations (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), and (2.16) to obtain the following expressions for
equilibrium trade flows across countries:
σ−1



Xni = Φni 

Kn Φn θ
σ−1
θ

Kn Φn

+ (1 −

−1

Kn )(Φdn )
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σ−1
θ

wn L̄n ,

∀ i 6= n

(2.17)

σ−1



Xnn = Φnn

K Φ θ
 n n

−1

+ (1 − Kn )(Φdn )

σ−1

Kn Φn θ + (1 − Kn )(Φdn )

σ−1
−1
θ
σ−1
θ



(2.18)

wn L̄n

where Xni is the monetary value of trade flows from country n to country i.
Proof. Please check Appendix 2.7.4.
Note that, when Kn = 1, equations (2.13)-(2.18) collapse to their Eaton-Kortum
counterparts. Therefore, the Eaton-Kortum model is ultimately a subcase of my
model in which the probability of obtaining a license is Kn = 1 for all countries n in
S. That is, the Eaton-Kortum model is the subcase of my model in which there are
no NTBs.

2.3.5

Ideal Price Index

As it is common in the trade literature, I define the ideal price index Pn in country
n to be the quantity that makes following expression hold: Un =

wn
.
Pn

That is, the

price index is a “deflator” that allows me to convert a country’s nominal wage wn to
a real wage Un that reflects the country’s true welfare level.
It can be shown that the ideal price index for consumers in country n satisfied
the following relationship:

Pn1−σ





σ−1
σ−1
1−σ
=Γ
+ 1 Kn Φn θ + (1 − Kn )(Φdn ) θ 
θ





(2.19)

where Γ is the gamma function.
Proof. Please check Appendix 2.7.2.
Analogously to previous sections, one can verify that when Kn = 1 the expression
for the ideal price index collapses to its Eaton-Kortum counterpart, namely Γ( 1−σ
+
θ
σ−1

1)Φn θ . Moreover, since Φn > Φdn as argued above, then equation (2.19) implies
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that the price index Pn is decreasing in Kn . That is, the laxer are import licenses
in country n, the lower the average level of prices faced by that country’s consumers
will be, which is consistent with the results from Section 2.3.3 regarding conditional
and unconditional price distributions.

2.3.6

Equilibrium

In the previous sections, it was established that agents maximize their utility and
firms maximize their profits in the model’s equilibrium. To close the model, I add
a market clearing equation. Specifically, I impose that the total wages paid to the
mass of workers of country i must equal the total revenue that firms in that country
obtain from selling their production to all countries around the world. Formally:
wi L̄i =

X

Xni , ∀i ∈ S

(2.20)

n∈S

Having defined a market clearing condition, it is now possible to formally define
the model’s equilibrium:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). Given parameters (σ, θ) and exogenous variables {Tn ,
{dni }i , Kn }n , an equilibrium is a set of endogenous variables {wn , {Xni ,Φni }i , Φn ,
Φfn , Φdn }n that satisfies the definitions in (2.6)-(2.9), the price index equation (2.19),
the trade flow equations (2.17)-(2.18), and the market clearing equation (2.20).
That is, given knowledge of deep parameters and of the exogenous variables
related to the underlying geography (d and T ) and to NTB policy (K), an equilibrium
is a set of endogenous variables that satisfy the model’s main equations, which were
outlined above.
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2.4

Empirical Methodology

Having presented the theoretical model in Section 2.3, in this section I develop an
empirical methodology that uses that model to estimate the magnitude of NTBs
using real-world data.
Note that NTBs are represented in the model by variable Kn , the probability that
a consumer from country n obtains an import license. More precisely, one should
think of Kn as measuring the “lack” of NTBs since the intensity of NTBs decreases
with Kn . In other words, a high Kn implies a high likelihood that a consumer
will have access to foreign markets, hence low NTBs. If Kn = 1, the consumer is
always allowed to import foreign goods, thus NTBs do not exist in that case. On
the opposite extreme, if Kn = 0 the consumer never obtains a license and is thus
completely shut out of foreign markets, in which case NTBs are maximal.
Many variables in the model can be directly measured in real-world data. Specifically, trade flows (X), wages (w), and population (L̄) are available in data sources
that are routinely used in the international trade literature. Price indices (P ) are a
little less usual but are also available, at least for a significant subset of countries. On
the other hand, parameters (σ, θ), bilateral “iceberg” trade costs (d), productivities
(T ), and NTBs (K) are usually not readily observed in the data. For the purposes
of this section, I will assume that (σ, θ) have already been estimated or borrowed
from the literature. Therefore, the only variables that remain to be estimated are
(d, T, K): trade costs, productivities, and our central variable of interest, K.
In order to estimate these three variables, I propose an empirical methodology
that combines the theoretical model’s equilibrium equations with data on trade flows,
wages, population, relative price indices, and price gaps to compute the values of
(d,T ,K) that make the model perfectly match the observed data.
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In the remainder of this Section 2.4, I present this methodology in further detail. I
first present the relevant system of equations that must be solved to obtain estimates
of (d, T, K). I then argue that we should expect the system to be exactly identified.

2.4.1

System of Equations

I now present a system containing four sets of equations, whose solution will allow
me to recover variables (d, T, K). The first set of equations in the system is simply
composed of equations (2.17)-(2.18) above, which govern trade flows.
The second set of equations governs relative prices. Consider equation (2.19),
which expresses the price index as function of endogenous and exogenous variables.
Evaluating this equation for country n and for an arbitrarily chosen “reference country” r, we obtain the following equation for the relative price index of country n with
respect to the “reference” country r:


Pn
Pr

1−σ



=

σ−1

σ−1
θ

σ−1

σ−1
θ

K Φ θ + (1 − Kn )(Φdn )
 n n
Kr Φr θ + (1 − Kr )(Φdr )




(2.21)

Note that the (adjusted) price index Pn1−σ is originally defined by the expression
R1
j=0

pn (j)1−σ = E(pn (j)1−σ ). That is, the price index in a country is related to the

average price paid by consumers in that country. It follows that the relative price
index in equation (2.21) is related to the ratio of the average prices paid by consumer
in n versus in the reference country r. For example, if a given country n∗ faces very
high prices on average, its price index Pn∗ will be high, as will be its relative price
index

P n∗
.
Pr

The third set of equations is associated to the price gap between the prices of
domestic and foreign goods in a given country. The existence of these price gaps is an
important diference between my model with NTBs and the original Eaton-Kortum
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model. As argued above, in the original Eaton-Kortum model the equilibrium distribution of prices actually paid by importers in country n is the same for every seller
country i. In particular, the distribution is the same for domestic goods and imported goods. But in the model with NTBs this invariance result breaks down: the
distribution of prices actually paid by domestic goods first-order stochastically dominates the corresponding distribution for imports. That is, domestic goods tend to be
more expensive than imported goods, generating a price gap. For intuition, consider
that NTBs can be seen as randomly destroying profitable international transactions,
forcing domestic consumers to resort to more expensive domestic goods.
Given these considerations, in the following equation I define a measure of the
price gap for a given country n and express it in terms of variables and parameters:




E((pjn )1−σ |j imported) 
P Gapn ≡ 
E((pjn )1−σ )

1
1−σ

= Kn + (1 − Kn )

1
 d  σ−1 ! σ−1
θ
Φ

n

Φn

(2.22)

Note that the price gap P Gapn in country n is defined as the ratio of average
(adjusted) domestic prices to average (adjusted) overall prices in that country. That
is, the price gap will be wider if the average price of imports is very different from the
average price of domestic goods. Futhermore, inspection of equation (2.22) shows
that P Gapn ≤ 1 since (Φ, Φd ) ≥ 0,

σ−1
θ

> 0, Φd ≤ Φ, and Kn ∈ [0, 1] for all n. This

implies that E((pjn )1−σ |j imported) is always weakly larger than E((pjn )1−σ ). Since
1 − σ < 0, the implication of this inequality is that prices of imported goods tend
to be lower than prices of domestic goods, as argued above. Finally, note that when
Kn = 1 for every country n the model collapses to the original Eaton-Kortum model
and equation (2.22) yields P Gapn = 1 for all n. Therefore, in the case without NTBs
we are back to Eaton-Kortum’s invariance result, as expected.

90

The fourth and last set of equations is simply a normalization. It can be shown
that the equilibrium system of equations is homogeneous of degree zero on the productivity vector T . That is, for any equilibrium, one can multiply all productivities
by a constant and the new set of variables will still solve the equilibrium system.
Therefore, it is necessary to make a normalization assumption so that the equilibrium system has an unique solution. Specifically, I normalize the productivity level
of the reference country r mentioned above to be equal to one:
Tr = 1

(2.23)

Given these four sets of equations, I obtain an equilibrium system that can be
inverted to back out unobserved variables (d, T, K), given appropriate data. To
reiterate, the system is composed of equations (2.17), (2.18), (2.21), (2.22), and
(2.23).

2.4.2

Model Inversion

Suppose the values of parameters (θ, σ) is known and data on observed variables
(X,w,L̄,

P
,P Gap)
Pr

is available. Given this knowledge, we can then solve the system

of equations from the last subsection to back out the unobservables (d, T, K), in
a process known as inversion. In other words, we choose the set of unobservables
(d, T, K) that allow the model to perfectly match the data (on trade flows, wages,
populations, relative prices, and price gaps). That is, the methodology maximizes
the model’s fit to the data. To obtain intuition about why the equation system has an
unique solution for (d, T, K), let us consider the number of equations and unknowns
in the system.
First, trade-flow equations (2.17)-(2.18) total N 2 − N equations because, for each
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row of trade matrix X, it is possible to compute any given entry as the difference
between that country’s income and the sum of the other row entries. Relativeprice equation (2.21) totals N − 1 equations, because the equation is trivial when
evaluating it at n = r. Price-gap equation (2.22) features N equations, one for each
country. Lastly, equation (2.23) features one equation. Adding up, the total number
of equations in the system is N 2 + N . Second, the trade-cost matrix d has N 2 − N
unknown entries, since dii = 1 for every country i. Productivity vectors T and NTB
vector K feature N unknowns each. Adding up, the total number of unknowns in
the system is N 2 + N .
Therefore, the number of unknowns equals the number of equations. In other
words, the theoretical model with NTBs has enough degrees of freedom to simultaneously match the data on trade flows, wages, populations, relative price indices,
and price gaps. At least in principle, if we have independent data on observables
(X, w, L, PPr , P Gap) and parameters (σ, θ), we can solve the system posed by equations (2.17), (2.18), (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) to recover unobserved variables (d, T, K),
and in particular NTB variable K.
Finally, to get some additional intuition regarding identification, compare my
model with NTBs to the conventional Eaton-Kortum model. In the latter, trade
costs (d) and productivities (T ) are identified (up-to-scale) by using data on wages,
population, trade shares, and price levels. In my model, I add an extra set of N
variables representing NTBs (i.e. variable K) which require an additional set of N
equations (i.e. price-gap equation (2.22)) to be identified.
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2.5

Estimation of Price Gaps

As described in Section 2.4, my methodology can be used to back out NTB estimates
given data on wages, population, trade flows, (relative) price indices, and price gaps.
While the first three data types are commonly used in the trade literature, data on
price gaps is not. Therefore, in this section I propose an econometric approach to
ˆ n }n , I
estimate these price gaps. After recovering these price-gap estimates {P Gap
am then able to fully implement the inversion methodology from Section 2.4.
The first step in estimating price gaps is to obtain separate data on import prices
and “average” prices. For example, one could obtain import prices from the CEPII’s
BACI data set, which can be used to compute “unit values” of imported goods which
are then interpreted as prices. For average prices, we could use the World’s Bank
ICP data set (Eaton and Kortum (2002), Waugh (2010), Simonovska and Waugh
(2014)), which includes prices for “global core” items. In both cases, one needs to
define a set of G goods categories g ∈ {1, ..., G} and match goods in each of the two
data sources to these G categories. The resulting data set consists of a pair of prices
(pBACI
, pICP
ng
ng ) for each country n and good g in {1, ..., G}.
The next step is to build an estimator for price gaps that compares varieties’
prices for domestic versus imported goods, and then averages across varieties. A
simple estimator can be build by using a direct analogy to the formulation in Eaton
and Kortum (2002):
G
X
pBACI (g)
ˆ n) = 1
ln(P Gap
ln nICP
G g=1
pn (g)





(2.24)

For each goods category, this estimator computes the log-difference between import prices (in BACI) and overall prices (in ICP) and then averages the difference

93

across goods categories. One advantage of this strategy is that it is derived off
within-good price ratios, partially allaying concerns regarding units of measurement.
In other words, for each goods category the estimator computes a percent difference between import and overall prices, which can then be compared to other goods
categories without worrying about each good’s unit of measurement.
Additionally, I propose a slightly more complex fixed-effects approach to extract
country-level estimates of average prices separately for domestic and overall prices,
whose exponentiated difference then yields an estimate of country-level price gaps.
To implement this approach, I first estimate the following fixed-effects model:

ln(pngs ) = βns + αng + ngs

(2.25)

where pngs is the price of goods category g in country n from data source s ∈ {BACI,
ICP }, βns are a set of country-data source fixed effects, αng are a set of countrygoods category fixed effects, and ngs is an error term. Estimating this equation
yields estimates of country-data source fixed effects, β̂ns , which can then be used to
obtain a price-gap estimate for country n as follows:

ˆ n = eβ̂n,BACI −β̂n,ICP
P Gap

(2.26)

ˆ n are the last input needed to implement the
These price-gap estimates P Gap
model inversion described above in Section 2.4, thus guaranteeing the feasibility of
the overall empirical methodology given appropriate data.
Note that in our estimation of equations (2.24) and (2.25) we implicitly give equal
weight to all goods categories. While there is no clear indication from the theory on
whether this or another weighting scheme is more appropriate, we can experiment
with alternate weighting schemes, for example by weighting categories by their trade
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volume or share in consumption, and then check the robustness of results to these
changes. An additional concern may be that foreign-to-domestic price gaps may be
indicative not only of NTBs but also of differences in average quality. This concern
can be allayed by checking the robustness of the results to restricting estimation to
a set of relatively “homogenous” goods, for example commodities (e.g. rice, coffee),
for which it is believed that quality differences should be trivial.

2.6

Conclusion

Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to international trade are often considered important in
informal discussions on the media and in policymaking circles, but they are relatively
understudied in the international trade literature compared to other barriers such
as geography and tariffs. This is partially due to the difficulty of measuring NTBs
and of integrating them into mainstream trade models in a tractable way. In this
paper, I tackle this challenge by extending a workhorse quantitative trade model
(Eaton and Kortum (2002)) to include NTBs and proposing an empirical methodology through which the model can be estimated using real-world data, thus obtaining
easily interpretable quantitative measures of NTBs.
I start by proposing a theoretical model based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) that
features NTBs in the form of import licenses. A consumer in country n must ask
her government for an import license to be able to import foreign goods, which are
randomly granted with a certain probability. If she does not obtain the license, she
is restriced to shopping among domestic sellers only. In equilibirum, trade flows,
wages, and price indices are governed by similar equations to the ones in the EatonKortum model, but a “price gap” emerges within each country between the average
price of imported goods and of domestic goods. This is explained by the fact that im-
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port licenses destroy some international transactions, diverting consumers’ purchases
towards a more expensive domestic variety.
I then propose an empirical methodology to estimate the model using real-world
data and extract model-implied NTB measures. This can be done by solving the
equilibrium equation system for unobservable variables (NTBs, productivities, and
trade costs) given data on trade flows, wages, populations, (relative) price indices,
and price gaps, and given knowledge of the values of key parameters. Intuitively, the
model identifies the magnitude of NTBs through the size of each country’s average
price gap between domestic and imported varieties.
While most of the required data is available from widely used data sets in the
trade literature, price-gap data is relatively less common. Because of that, I propose a
fixed-effects approach to estimating price gaps for each country by leveraging separate
data on import prices (like in CEPII’s BACI data set) and “overall” prices (like in
the World’s Bank ICP data set). I use this data to estimate a fixed-effects model,
obtaining estimates of country-data source fixed effects. By taking the difference of
a country’s fixed effect for BACI versus ICP and exponentiating the result, I obtain
a measure of country-specific price gaps. These price gaps can then be directly used
in the main methodology to invert the model using real-world data and obtain NTB
measures.
The methodology proposed in this paper suggests a number of future avenues of
research. First, the methodology can be implemented on data by harmonizing the
goods categories in the BACI and ICP data sets, obtaining and harmonizing data on
other key variables, and then performing the model inversion described on this paper
to obtain quantitative NTB measures. These measures can then be independently
studied, for example by analyzing the their correlation with more traditional NTB
measures in the literature. It should also be interesting to try to extend model to
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allow the magnitude of NTBs to vary not only across countries but also across trade
partners for a given country (i.e. differential trade policy across partners) while
preserving theoretical results that allow for an analogous empirical methodology.
Another interesting avenue has to do with the interpretation of the recovered NTB
measure, variable K. In this paper, this variable is interpreted as representing NTBs
but it is plausible they can also reflect other factors that generate price gaps such as
port-to-shelf transportation costs or mark-ups charged by domestic intermediaries.
It would be interesting to analyze the recovered measures of NTBs to address this
possibility.

2.7

Appendix

This Appendix contains proofs for the results in Section 2.3.

2.7.1

Price distributions

Conditional on not obtaining an import license for a given good, the consumer must
buy the good from a domestic supplier. Thus, the relevant price distribution in that
case is given by:
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Gdn (p)

wn dnn τnn
≡ Pr(pn (j) ≤ p|no license) = Pr(pnn (j) ≤ p) = Pr
≤p =
zn (j)




wn dnn τnn
wn dnn τnn
= Pr zn (j) ≥
= 1 − Pr zn (j) ≤
=
p
p




=1 − exp  − Tn





wn dnn τnn
p


−θ




=1 − exp  − pθ Tn wn dnn τnn



−θ

=

(2.27)




=

θ Φd
n

=1 − e−p

2.7.2

Ideal Price Index

As in many other papers in the trade literature, the CES utility function in equation
(2.1) implies that the ideal price index in country n is given by Pn = [

1

pn (j)1−σ ] 1−σ .

R1
0

Taking into account the price distribution in country n (equation 2.12),the formula
for the ideal price index in equation (2.19) can be thusly derived:
Pn1−σ =
=

Z 1
0

pn (j)1−σ =

Z ∞

p

1−σ

0

=Kn

Z ∞
0

Z ∞



Kn θp

0
θ−1

p1−σ dGn (p) =
−pθ Φn

Φn e

p1−σ θpθ−1 Φn e−p

θΦ
n

+ (1 − Kn )θp

dp + (1 − Kn )

θ−1

θ d
Φdn e−p Φn

Z ∞
0



dp =

p1−σ θpθ−1 Φdn e−p

θ Φd
n

dp =

σ−1
1−σ
1−σ
=Kn Φn Γ
+ 1 + (1 − Kn )(Φdn ) θ Γ
+1 =
θ
θ



σ−1
σ−1
1−σ
=Γ
+ 1 Kn Φn θ + (1 − Kn )(Φdn ) θ
θ
σ−1
θ









(2.28)
where I used the fact that for x ∈ R+ the gamma function is defined as Γ(x) ≡
R ∞ x−1 −t
t e dt,
0

and the equivalence

R ∞ 1−σ θ−1
p θp Φ

−pθ Φn
dp
ne

0

σ−1

= Φn θ

with the change of variable from p to t given by equation t = pθ Φn .
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R∞
0

t

1−σ
θ

e−t dt,

2.7.3

Measure of Goods

What is the probability πni that a consumer in country n will buy a given good
variety j from foreign country i 6= n? In order to do so, she must have obtained
an import license, and additionally country i must be that good’s cheapest supplier
worldwide. Thus, the probability πni is given by:





πni = Pr(license) × Pr pni (j) ≤ pnk (j), ∀k ∈ S license =




= Pr(license) × Pr pni (j) ≤ pnk (j), ∀k ∈ S =
=Kn
=Kn

Z ∞
0

=Kn Φni
=Kn Φni

Y





Pr pnk ≥ p dp =

k6=i

Z ∞
0

fni (p)

θpθ−1 Φni e−p

θΦ
ni

Y

e−p

θΦ
nk

dp =
(2.29)

k6=i

Z ∞

θpθ−1

0

Z ∞

Y

−pθ Φnk

dp =

P

dp =

e

k

θpθ−1 e−p

θ

k

Φnk

0

Φni Z ∞
θ
Φn θpθ−1 e−p Φn dp =
Φn 0

∞

Φni
Φni 
Φni
−pθ Φn
=Kn
−e
= Kn
− 0 − (−1) = Kn
Φn
Φn
Φn
p=0
=Kn

where fni (p) =

d
F (p)
dp ni

and Fni (p) is the distribution of prices offered by sellers from

country i to buyers in country n:




θ−1

−pθ Φni

Fni (p) ≡ Pr pni (j) ≤ p = 1 − e−p
⇒fni (p) = θp

Φni (j)e

θΦ
ni

(2.30)

What about the probability πnn that a consumer in n buys a given variety j from
a domestic supplier? This happens under two scenarios: when the consumer does
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not obtain a license, and when she does obtain a license but the domestic supplier
is still the cheapest supplier worldwide. Thus the probability is given by:




πnn = Pr(no license) + Pr(license) × Pr pnn (j) ≤ pni (j), ∀i ∈ S license =




=(1 − Kn ) + Kn Pr pnn (j) ≤ pni (j), ∀i ∈ S =
=(1 − Kn ) + Kn
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(2.31)
dp =

Φnn Z ∞
θ
=(1 − Kn ) + Kn
Φn θpθ−1 e−p Φn dp =
Φn 0


=(1 − Kn ) + Kn

∞

Φnn 
θ
− e−p Φn 
Φn

=

p=0

=(1 − Kn ) + Kn
=Kn

2.7.4

Φnn
Φnn
Φnn
= Kn
+ (1 − Kn )
=
Φn
Φn
Φnn

Φdn
+ (1 − Kn )
Φn

Trade Flows

In Eaton and Kortum (2002), once the expressions for the “measure of goods”, πni
are known, it is straightfoward to obtain expressions for trade flows, Xni . In fact,
in their case trade flows are simply given by Xni = πni Yn , where Yn is total income
in country n. This is because in their model the distribution of prices faced by
consumers in country n conditional on buying from country i is the same across all
seller countries i. As will now be shown, this result does not hold for my model.
What is then the distribution of varieties’ prices in country n conditional on
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actually buying the variety from country i? For i 6= n, consider that the consumer
will buy the good from country i only if she obtains a license and the supplier from
country i is the cheapest in the world. Thus:





Hni (p) ≡ Pr pni (j) ≤ p|n buys from i =




= Pr pni (j) ≤ p license


=

Pr pni (j) ≤ p

T

license



Pr license

T

\

T



pni (j) ≤ pnk (j)∀k  =

pni (j) ≤ pnk (j)∀k

pni (j) ≤ pnk (j)∀k



=



Pr(license) × Pr pni (j) ≤ p

T

pni (j) ≤ pnk (j)∀k

Pr(license) × Pr pni (j) ≤ pnk (j)∀k

=
=

Rp

θq θ−1 Φni e−q Φni k6=n e−q
Φni /Φn



=



(2.32)

Pr(pnk (j) ≥ q)dq
=
= 0
Φni /Φn
Rp
Q
0 fni (q) k6=n [1 − Fnk (q)]dq
=
=
Φni /Φn
=

fni (q)

=





Rp



0

Z p

0

k6=n

θ

θq

θ−1

0

Z p

Q

Φn

Y

Q

−q θ Φnk

e

dq =

θΦ
nk

Z p
0

k

θq

θ−1

−q θ Φn

Φn e



dq

θq θ−1 Φn e−q

−q θ Φn

dq = − e

=

p
q=0

θ

P
k

Φnk

= 1 − e−p

dq =

θΦ
n

On the other hand, consumers in country n will buy a given variety from domestic
suppliers either when they do not obtain a license or when they do obtain a license
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but the domestic supplier still provides the cheapest worldwide price. Thus:
Pr(pnn (j) ≤ p n buys from n)
=
Hnn (p) ≡ Pr(pnn (j) ≤ p|n buys from n) =
Pr(n buys from n)
T



=

Pr pnn (j) ≤ p



T



no license + Pr pnn (j) ≤ p

license

T

pnn (j) ≤ pni (j)∀i



πnn
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T

(1 − Kn )Fnn (p) + Kn Pr pnn (j) ≤ p



T
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=
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=
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=
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(2.33)

Thus, what has just been derived are the price distributions faced by country n
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=

conditional on actually buying from any given location i. The corresponding price
densities can be written as:
d
θ
Hni (p) =θpθ−1 Φn e−p Φn , ∀i 6= n
dp
θ
θ d
d
Kn Φdn θpθ−1 Φn e−p Φn (1 − Kn )Φn θpθ−1 Φdn e−p Φn
hnn (p) ≡ Hnn (p) =
+
dp
Kn Φdn + (1 − Kn )Φn
Kn Φdn + (1 − Kn )Φn
hni (p) ≡

(2.34)

Having derived these expression, it is now finally possible to derive the equations
for trade flows. Note that given the CES utility function, the quantity of a variety j
demanded by consumers in country n with national income Yn is given by:
qn (j) =

pn (j)−σ
Yn
Pn1−σ

(2.35)

where Pn is the ideal price index given by equation (2.19) and pn (j) is the relevant
d
price faced by the consumer (i.e. pw
n (j) if they have a license for good j, and pn (j)

otherwise). This implies that the monetary value of consumers’ expenditure on that
good j is:
xn (j) ≡ pn (j)qn (j) =

pn (j)1−σ
Yn
Pn1−σ

(2.36)

For a given foreign country i 6= n, trade flows from i to country n can thus be
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expressed as:
Yn Z 1
Xni =
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(2.37)

Conversely, trade flows from country n to itself can be expressed as:
Xnn

Yn Z 1
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=


wn L̄n

(2.38)
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